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CHAPTER II

THE COLONIAL DIALECTIC

The French presence did indeed transform North African segmentary society, subject it to new and more efficient centralized administrations, and create an alien political space, territorially defined, which indigenous elements could subsequently capture. In North Africa, as in much of the Third World, colonizers planted the seeds of their own destruction by restratifying indigenous society, educating new elites, creating discontented urban and rural proletariats and lumpen proletariats, and undermining political structures without being able to replace them with new ones subservient to the colonial order. But no colonial dialectic - only conflict was inevitable.

THE DIALECTICS OF EMANCIPATION

Dialectic in the Hegelian sense assumes a constructive confrontation, one of "identity in opposition," between master and slave (or colonizer and colonized). Unfortunately colonial situations have rarely justified Hegel's faith in the "vast power of negation," his assumption about world history that conflict ultimately leads to higher synthesis. In North Africa anti-colonialism, through which indigenous elements reappropriated the political space defined by the colonizer, generated a new political foundation only in Tunisia, not in Algeria where the conflict was most intense and the French presence most overwhelming. As Frantz Fanon might have agreed, violence alone was not enough to restructure Algeria.¹ In North Africa, as more generally in the Third World, the critical intervening variable was the nationalist elite, the leaders of the confrontation with the colonial power. Depending partly on the colonial situation, partly on their own sense of purpose, they could be the motor of "dialectic," of "positive" confrontation - or the perpetrators of unreasoning violence or the passive inheritors of the colonial order. But for a new political design to take shape in the process of colonial emancipation, the elite had to be sufficiently homogeneous to share public purposes beyond the immediate struggle, sufficiently assimilated to the colonial political culture to utilize and redirect colonial structures and values, and sufficiently powerful to neutralize any aspiring indigenous counter-elite. When, as in Tunisia, these conditions were met, the elite could articulate a new political culture and build a political infrastructure reaching into society, even while - and for the sake of - struggling against colonial domination. Without a coherent modernizing elite, on the other hand, political change lacked direction. In Morocco and Algeria indigenous people finally replaced the French administrators, but the new rulers survive on old formulae, not new designs of their own making. Differences between the three contemporary North African systems, indeed, are largely explained by differences in the nature of their respective nationalist elites.

By definition, nationalist elites become such only so far as they achieve consciousness of their historic role: their mission of appropriating or, from their standpoint, "recovering" the political space of the colonizer. Abstractly speaking, three modes of consciousness are possible, once colonial pacification rules out primary modes of resistance and it is no longer possible to fight

¹ Frantz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la terre* (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1961) pp. 109-10.

foreign domination, as the Emir Abdelkader did, by exclusively traditional means. The first mode or "moment" is that of liberal assimilation. Sons of the shocked old elite admire and imitate the new rulers, assimilate some of their styles and values, accept the rules of their game, and attempt to engage in dialogue. But in most colonial situations this mode of consciousness is inadequate. The colonizers cease to be gentlemen, once natives try to play their game, and moreover, the Westernized natives are cut off from their own society, even though they may try to reeducate it. In any case, the identity in opposition between colonizer and this first-moment nationalist elite is bound to be superficial: there can be little positive confrontation.

A second possible mode of consciousness is that of traditional anti-colonialism, entailing a reassertion of traditional values against the alien presence. The second-moment elite may thus acquire a mass base in the traditional society and so embarrass and displace any lingering first-moment elite. But the traditionalist mode of consciousness is also one-sided (much like the "stubborn" slave Hegel depicts as unable to construct a new identity or achieve emancipation)² for it is no longer "traditional" and can escape neither the foreign presence nor self-doubt, doubt, that is, in the traditions that are being asserted. Yet it is incapable of constructing a new political culture.

The third moment rejects traditionalism as well as assimilation and colonial domination, for it operates within as well as against the colonizers original space. It accepts foreign political innovations and uses them to restructure indigenous society, to mobilize masses against foreign rule. This radical outlook is the only mode of consciousness that can sustain a coherent modernizing elite and generate a new political design. Only in the third moment can nationalist elites get to the root of their problems and achieve full consciousness of their mission.

These modes of consciousness are obviously not historically necessary stages in the development of nationalism. Movements led by coalitions of "liberals" and traditionalists have often achieved independence in the Third World, and in especially permissive colonial settings the "liberals" have come to power all alone. In Morocco and Algeria all three types were included in the victorious coalitions, though in varying proportions: the Moroccan Istiqlal had a preponderance of second-moment leaders, while the leadership of the Algerian Front of National Liberation (FLN) was predominantly third-moment. But even when the colonial power is sufficiently intransigent to provoke revolutionary opposition, there is no guarantee that the resulting third mode of consciousness will express a synthetic response - one, that is, which contains yet transcends the assimilationist and traditionalist moments and achieves identity in opposition to the colonial presence. This happened only in Tunisia.

The dialectical analysis of North African nationalism helps to suggest why this is so. Only in Tunisia did the dialectic unfold gradually, each moment or mode of consciousness being the contribution of a distinct generation of leaders to an emergent Tunisian political culture. Comparisons with Moroccan and Algerian nationalism are possible, for the moments were present in these other settings; but instead of constituting a historic sequence, they developed simultaneously, producing fragmented political cultures incapable of sustaining coherent modernizing elites. In Tunisia, on the other hand, each moment was worked out in a nationalist movement, affording third-moment nationalists the historical background from which to derive a synthesis of their identity in opposition to colonialism.

² G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, J.B. Baillie, trans. (New York: Macmillan, 1949) pp.239-40.

Historical timing, however, really begs the question as to why a constructive dialectic was possible in Tunisia and did not materialize to the same degree in either Morocco or Algeria. Partly this was a matter of personalities. Habib Bourguiba, without doubt the most creative of North Africa's leaders in the twentieth century, has shaped Tunisia's radical elite in his ideal-typical image. But a Bourguiba would have been a political and sociological impossibility in either Morocco or Algeria for reasons that will become clear. There are two more fundamental explanations. First, it could be argued that even precolonial Tunisia was a special case, in that the country, though unable to withstand foreign conquest, was politically more developed than its neighbors and was governed by an elite more attuned to modernization and hence open to a "colonial dialectic." But this explanation alone is not very satisfying, for we have seen that the nineteenth-century elite was fragmented and corrupt, hardly the prototype for a coherent modernizing elite which, in any event, emerged only in the 1930's, and from non-elite segments of the society. Rather, for a satisfactory explanation of the colonial dialectic and its preconditions, we must turn to a second, more general level of explanation. The nationalist elites of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia evolved in three very distinctive colonial settings. It is primarily the difference in French policies, their impact, and timing that account for differences in the respective elites and their confrontations with the colonial power.

THE COLONIAL SITUATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

By all counts Algeria was the most intensively colonized country of the Maghrib - and indeed of the Third World, if one excepts South Africa and possibly Palestine - while Moroccan society was the least affected by the French presence. The timing alone is significant: Algeria was first invaded in 1830, whereas French protectorates were established in Tunisia and Morocco only in 1881 and 1912, respectively. French rule lasted 132 years in Algeria (until 1962), 75 years in Tunisia (until 1956), but only 44 years in Morocco (until 1956). Furthermore, Algeria suffered the bulk of North Africa's settler population; in 1955 the 1,700,000 "Europeans" in North Africa constituted 11 percent of Algeria's total population but only 6.7 and 5.2 percent, respectively of Tunisia's and Morocco's.³ The settlers moreover had in one way or another appropriated more than seven million acres, or 27 percent, of Algeria's arable land, compared to only two million acres (21 percent) in Tunisia and two and a half million acres (7 percent) in Morocco.⁴ Juridically speaking, too, Algeria was an "integral part" of France, whereas Tunisia and Morocco were Protectorates which had preserved their indigenous precolonial governments in an emasculated form.

Algeria, in fact, was too intensively colonized for a constructive dialectic to be either sociologically or politically possible. It was not sociologically possible because France virtually obliterated the traditional elites - and traditions - upon which any third-moment syntheses depended. It was not politically possible because the French stakes were too high to tolerate an organized radical elite as in Tunisia. By contrast, Morocco was not colonized intensively enough for full nationalist consciousness to take control; the colonial presence did not re-stratify indigenous

³ Jean Despois, *L'Afrique blanche* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958) I, 198.

⁴ For Algeria, see Grigori Lazarev, "Auto-gestion agricole en Algérie," in *Institutions et développement agricole du Maghreb* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965) p.23. For Tunisia and Morocco see René Gallissot, *L'Économie de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961) pp.47-48.

society in a way that would have encouraged radical leadership. More generally, to explain colonial dialectic or its absence, the critical variables of the colonial situations to consider are: (1) policies toward old elites; (2) educational policies creating new elites; (3) economic development, so far as it produces detached strata or preserves primordial strata available to support nationalist elites; and (4) styles of colonial conflict. We shall discuss each of these variables in comparative perspective.

OLD ELITES

The duration alone of the colonial presence in Algeria and Tunisia ensured the decay of old, precolonial elite families before independence. Irrespective of colonial policy, they were bound to decline in prestige and power, for a policy of direct rule would destroy their status, while one of indirect rule would discredit them in the eyes of a rising nationalist elite and other strata created by the colonial situation. Only in Morocco was the timing such as to allow the precolonial elite to retain its status - and indeed to use nationalism to recover its power. Even in Morocco the colonial situation altered - or at least appeared to alter - the structure of the elite, in that old families or segments of families cooperating with the Protectorates could not always also be recognized by the nationalists.

The timing of the colonial penetration also conditioned the particular policies adopted by the French. French and international attitudes on colonial questions evolved considerably between the early nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The rapacious *laissez-faire* attitudes that conditioned Algerian development until the bitter end were never strong in Morocco, for they had become an anachronism by the time the Moroccan Protectorate was established. Increasing respect both for indigenous traditions and international opinion is suggested by the very formula France used to establish control over Tunisia and Morocco, that of a "protectorate" or indirect rule. And in Morocco the latecomer, the formula was most nearly (though very inadequately) respected. Here, and to a lesser degree in Tunisia, the traditional *makhzan* and its family clienteles were to be preserved as museum pieces, endowing the colonial system with a legitimacy of sorts. Indirect rule, in short, meant the survival, albeit in distorted form, of a traditional elite.

Destruction of Elites in Algeria. In this respect the contrast between Algeria and the two Protectorates could not be more striking. In Algeria colonial rule was direct, established by organized violence ignorant of traditional intermediaries and the uses to which they could be put. As early as 1833 a French parliamentary commission reported: "We have exceeded in barbarity the barbarians whom we came to civilize."⁵ Actually the systematic destruction of the Algerian countryside began only in 1840, when Marshal Bugeaud engaged in "total war" to reduce tribal resistance. With more than one hundred thousand troops it took seven years to subdue the Emir Abdelkader's five- to ten-thousand-man army and his tribal allies. Indiscriminate search-and-destroy tactics, the routine burning of the crops of "disloyal" tribes, and occasional incinerations, in villages or even caves, of hundreds of men, women, and children terrorized populations into submission while sporadic revolts after 1847, culminating in the Kabylean insurrection of 1871, resulted in further destruction of traditional Algerian society. Combat and illness are estimated to have taken a toll of more than one hundred thousand French soldiers from 1830 to 1871. There are

⁵ Charles-André Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine: conquête et colonisation* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964) p.110.

no reliable estimates of the number of Algerian civilian and military casualties. However, Algeria probably had a population of three million in 1830. Official censuses indicate a Muslim population of 2,770,000 in 1861, after most of the populated areas had been "pacified," and 2,125,000 eleven years later, after famine and cholera had ravaged them.⁶

Until the advent in 1871 of the Third Republic and the triumph of settler-inspired "assimilation," French colonial policy oscillated between this policy and faltering efforts of "association" under the military Arab Bureaux. Assimilation meant the destruction of native institutions in the interests of the settler community. "What could be more legitimate," one settler explained, "than dominating 2,500,000 Arabs for the higher interests of forty million Frenchmen?" One influential Republican politician, Prevost-Paradol, made quite explicit the Darwinist overtones of assimilation: "We must establish laws conceived uniquely for the extension of the French colony and then let the Arabs do their best, with equal arms, in the struggle for life."⁷ Few intellectuals of the French Left, indeed, had any sympathy for the natives or their traditional structures. Socialists of the Saint-Simonian school, like Enfantin, were thrilled with possibilities of social engineering in virgin Algeria and devised elaborate schemes of colonization, but their state capitalism ignored the native. Only the liberal historian, Michelet, was ready to make the comparison between the Algerian "who starves to death on his own devastated granary" and the European laborer who "works to death" to end his days "in a hospital."⁸

Napoleon III and the Arab Bureaux, once they had acquired an understanding of indigenous social structure and Islamic values, were more sympathetic. In 1863 Napoleon stated, "Algeria is not properly speaking a colony but an Arab kingdom."⁹ As his adviser, Thomas-Esmael Urbain, explained it, his policy of "association" required that the government arbitrate between Arabs and the growing settler population, rather than ignoring native interests or assuming them to be identical with colonization. There was to be a division of labor: Europeans would develop industry and commerce in the cities and specialized cultures on limited landholdings, while the natives would keep their land. But by this time it was too late to preserve indigenous structures, for Bugeaud's scorched-earth tactics had already undermined them. Twenty years earlier in occupied, or "pacified," territories he had attempted to copy the administration of his rival, Emir Abdelkader, but formal offices and titles meant less than the men, whom he arbitrarily changed. The new ones, serving out of fear or self-interest, generally lacked authority. In fact the French had probably even earlier forfeited the opportunity to establish indirect rule by destroying Turkish administration and desecrating urban religious institutions.

Immediately after the conquest of Algiers in 1830, the occupying power took over the public habous (religious foundation or endowment) properties whose income traditionally supported mosques, schools, and charities. In his famous parliamentary report of 1847, Alexis de Tocqueville lamented:

Everywhere we have put our hands on these revenues ... We have ruined charitable institutions, dropped the schools, and dispersed the seminaries. Around us lights have been extinguished, and the recruitment of men of

⁶ Despois, *op.cit.*, p.183.

⁷ Charles-Robert Ageron, *L'Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964) p.38.

⁸ Julien, *op.cit.*, p.261.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.425.

religion and men of law has ceased. In other words we have rendered Muslim society much more miserable, disorganized, ignorant, and barbaric than it was before knowing us.¹⁰

Indeed, the first decades of colonial rule virtually annihilated not only the Turks but also the indigenous urban bourgeoisie. The man of religion, law, and commerce had always been less influential in Algeria than in Morocco or Tunisia, but the French presence accentuated the differences. Pacification depopulated the cities, and most of them did not regain their Muslim population of 1830 until the twentieth century. Substantial remnants of a traditional bourgeoisie survived only in Constantine and Tlemcen (despite the famed exodus of leading Tlemcen families to Syria in 1911).

Traditional rural elites fared no better under colonial rule. Ironically it was Napoleon III, not the settlers nor the Republican politicians, who hastened tribal disaggregation in the countryside. The Senatus-Consultus of 1863 put an end to arbitrary expropriation of tribal land but fostered a new set of local institutions, the douar-communes, to encourage greater political participation at the expense of tribal notables. The law also permitted tribally owned land to be broken into privately owned pieces, thus undermining tribal cohesion and the authority of the chief. Moreover, no chief could preside over more than one commune, and his traditional judicial powers were placed in their hands. Those hurt the most by this legislation were the aristocratic chiefs of warrior tribes upon whom the Turks, and subsequently in some cases the Arab Bureaux, had relied to keep law and order and bring in the taxes. The Warnier Law of 1873 completed the destruction of the tribe by permitting property sales to Europeans. The coming of the Third Republic also meant that tribal chiefs, supported by the Arab Bureaux which settlers and Republicans distrusted, would have even less influence. It was his fear of the new regime that prompted Mokrane, a typical warrior chief, to spark the Kabyle insurrection of 1871.

Concomitant in the later nineteenth century with the decay of tribal elites was the rise of religious orders, hitherto contained and largely dominated, even when they called for holy war against the French, by the warrior tribes. By virtue of their doctrines and organization, they easily superseded not only the warrior but also the maraboutic tribes - the "honest brokers" who had, incidentally, been Emir Abdelkader's most reliable support.¹¹ While the French colonial rulers had taken over

many of the habous incomes supporting the religious orders, their zawiyas, dispensing Islamic instruction, continued to flourish on initiation fees and voluntary offerings. Indeed, the suppression of Islamic government seems to have enhanced their activity and prestige. Rather than eliminating the orders, the French kept their zawiyas under surveillance, influenced the election of their sheikhs and muqadamin (subordinate officials), and gradually, in the words of a French scholar and strategist, "wore them down by using them."¹²

By the turn of the century their leaders were virtually Algeria's sole traditional elite. They usefully intervened with local colonial authorities on behalf of their members, but they had submitted to the French presence after the insurrection of 1871, when the Rahmaniyya order had

¹⁰ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1962) III, 323.

¹¹ Pesseh Shinar, "Abd al-Qadir and Abd al-Krim: Religious Influences on their Thought and Action," *Asian and African Studies*, Annual of the Israel Oriental Society, I (1965) 139-74.

¹² See Augustin Berque, "Essai d'une bibliographie critique des confréries musulmanes algériennes," *Bulletin*, Société de Géographie et d'Archéologie de la Province d'Oran, Vol. XXXIX (1912).

mobilized masses in support of Mokrani. As they grew rich, however, their doctrines became conservative, and by the First World War their influence was waning. Algeria would acquire new nationalist elites, but they would have virtually no connection with traditional elites, worn down or destroyed by the intensive colonial situation. For this sociological reason, no colonial dialectic bridging traditional and modern values would be possible. The brutal French take-over dislocated Algerian society and precluded a dialogue across generations that would be possible in Tunisia and Morocco.

Elite survival in Morocco and Tunisia. It is perhaps not surprising that Tunisia's traditional elites survived the French invasion of their country in 1881, for, educated by the Algerian experience, they put up little resistance. Several weeks after the bey capitulated to French demands and signed the Treaty of Kasser Said, some marginal tribes, urged by religious brotherhoods, revolted against infidel rule, but the entire country was pacified in a matter of months. In Morocco, by contrast, the French did not complete their conquest of outlying mountainous areas until 1934, twenty-two years after the Protectorate was proclaimed. But though Morocco, like Algeria, was a difficult terrain to subdue, the French had become more experienced. Under the striking leadership of Marshal Lyautey, who had campaigned in Algeria and other colonial wars, the "oil spot" tactics of pacification involved an economy of violence, a maximum of mediation and political intrigue to divide the tribal opposition. And in both Tunisia and Morocco the French applied the formula of the protectorate so as to cover colonial designs with the legitimacy of the traditional makhzan. Especially in Morocco where the sultanate's legitimacy rested on religious grounds, the tactic was a brilliant success. Pacification was a modern military operation, or protracted series of operations, but it was undertaken in the name of the sultan and his makhzan and was not too different in form from the traditional warfare and bargaining that strong sultans had always employed to consolidate their rule. Thus, rather than destroying traditional elites as in Algeria, the French protected them and gradually won them over, conditionally, to act as agents of indirect rule.

The conception of a protectorate is that of a country keeping its institutions, governing and administering itself with its own organs, under the simple supervision [conrole] of a European power which, substituting itself for it in external representation, generally takes over the administration of its army and finances and directs its economic development. That which dominates and characterizes this conception is the formula of "supervision", not that of "direct administration".¹³

But actually "indirect rule" was already a myth by 1926, when Lyautey left Morocco in the hands of a succession of Resident Generals who, bowing to a greater extent to settler pressures, were less dedicated than he to his conception of a protectorate. In Tunisia, where these pressures were greater and had a longer history, the Protectorate was even more of a myth. In both countries French administrators controlled all-important policy-making in internal as well as external affairs, for treaties bound the bey and sultan to carry out all "administrative, judicial, and financial reforms that

¹³ Maréchal Louis-Hubert Lyautey, *La Renaissance du Maroc: dix ans de protectorat, 1912-1922* (Rabat: Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, 1922) p.113, cited in John P. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 1912-1944* (Cambridge: Center for Middle-Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1967) p.34. In my translation, *contrôle* is translated as "supervision" rather than "control".

the French government considers useful." ¹⁴ Under the nominal authority of the native head of state, French directors supervised by the Resident General established new administrations that in effect were modern French ministries. Traditional ministries of the respective makhzans persisted, and the Prime Minister of Grand Vizier theoretically had to approve legislation affecting them. Just as the bey or sultan, nominally sovereign, had to approve all legislation for it to be valid. But this approval was routine except when, under the pressure or influence of rising nationalism, the heads of state could no longer be rubber stamps for the colonial power. And at the regional and local levels French *contrôleurs civils* and native-affairs officers respectively represented the Resident General in the areas under civilian and military rule. In theory they "supervised" the makhzan's caids and other officials, but in practice they often administered populations directly, exercising the caid's judicial as well as administrative powers.

Nevertheless, the myth of the Protectorate did help to ensure the survival of traditional elites in Tunisia and Morocco. Unlike their forebears in Algeria, for instance, the French did not disrupt the *habous*, or religious foundations. The most they did, in Tunisia where settler pressure was strong, was to obligate the public *habous* administration to cede five thousand acres annually to the Tunisian state domain, which parceled them out to settlers. For the most part, traditional institutions were preserved, even though decades of French-inspired modernization emptied many of their substance. The mosque-universities of Zitouna (Tunis) and Qarawiyyin (Fez), for instance, survived independence, despite the growth of modern schools. The traditional mechanisms regulating urban commerce also survived, despite the virtual collapse of traditional commerce under modern competition. Traditional families in Tunisia and Morocco retained high status as they slowly adapted to the social changes induced by the foreign presence, the most notable one being a modern economic sector. And even as they adapted, the old families would not, unlike their Algerian counterparts, forget the traditions they embodied, preserved in the museums of the Protectorates.

It was in Morocco that the old families were most successful in adapting to the colonial situation, that is, acquiring new bases of wealth and prestige in the modern sector to compliment and reinforce their traditional statuses. The myth of the Protectorate sustained old makhzan families and tribal notables, while French favoritism - *la politique de grandes familles* - afforded them opportunities in agricultural and military pursuits. The traditional commercial bourgeoisie in Fez began to adapt to modern commerce even before the Protectorate. In addition to new wealth, many of its members acquired new status by joining a nationalist party. And Sultan Mohammed V, who became "king" in the eyes of young nationalists, was of course the most successful of all in translating his traditional status into modern wealth, prestige - and eventually power.

In Tunisia, too, old families acquired new statuses. On the eve of the Second World War, Henri de Montéty, a French *contrôleur civil*, did a remarkable study documenting their adaptation to the modern sector engendered by the French presence. We cannot here do adequate justice to his detailed findings, but he marshaled statistical evidence, involving a painstaking study of Tunisian elites, to show how the makhzan families, the caids and other provincial notables, the *ulama*, and the *baldi bourgeoisie* of Tunis (comparable to the Fassi merchants) "still [in 1938] occupy an important place, especially in positions of authority, of traditional culture, and of officialdom. In the new structures they have often been able to conquer the largest share, especially as lawyers, secular judges, and Old Destour [nationalist party] leaders."

¹⁴ Convention de la Marsa, June 8, 1883, cited in André Raymond, *La Tunisie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961) p.31.

Montéty goes on, however, to suggest the critical difference between the Moroccan and the Tunisian elite structure, the difference, in fact, which explains why a full dialectical interplay between colonizers and nationalists was possible in Tunisia but not in Morocco:

Nevertheless, despite the important place they still enjoy in the social structure, the role of the old families is already diminished by the simple fact that they have to share their influence and authority with the new elite, as the waves of new aspirants are storming the gates of command posts.¹⁵

Though the members of old families who competed with newcomers for new jobs in the modern sector had also adapted to modern civilization, the very fact of competition explains how dialectic was possible. In Morocco, by contrast, there was no time for newcomers to emerge in sufficient numbers to challenge the old families.

NEW ELITES

In the context of French North Africa, the indigenous stratum most likely to spearhead a fully conscious, radical confrontation with the colonizer were the French-educated intellectuals - graduates of French lycées and/or universities - for this stratum was the most exposed to political values of the metropolitan power and potentially the most capable of appealing to French audiences and so mobilizing these values in dialectical fashion against colonial domination. Furthermore, French education was the most obvious sign of elite status in the modern sector of colonial society. To be a member of the modern elite - whether as a lawyer, pharmacist, doctor, modern farmer, official, or businessman - a French education was virtually mandatory. Conversely, virtually every North African who acquired a diploma was assured of some respectable position in the modern sector. The graduates often complained, especially in Algeria, that their talents were not put to adequate use, that a repressive colonial power kept them out of responsible positions in government, and even that the French did not encourage higher studies. These complaints were often well founded but should not obscure the fact that graduates were ipso facto members of the new elite. The Maghrib did not produce a surplus of unemployable intellectuals, however angry, alienated, and nationalist (and unemployed) many of the graduates became.

French education was the passport guaranteeing entry into the new elite. Moreover, it took very few years of colonial rule, even in insular, self-centered Fez, for native North African society to recognize and respect French-educated compatriots, to recognize modern status distinctions based on education. Such recognition was perhaps a reflection of the traditional Islamic respect for (Arabic) learning. Widespread respect for French education, with its corollary of appreciable wealth and status, had one important implication for the colonial dialectic. French education systems could restratify native society.

In fact the colonial power did restratify Algerian and Tunisian society but had little impact upon the structure of the Moroccan elite. For, naturally, Algeria and Tunisia, being colonized earlier, received French schools before Morocco did. By the end of the Protectorate, it is true, many Moroccans had gone through French schools, but the few who had received higher degrees were from the first, favored waves of school-goers. By and large they tended to be sons of the

¹⁵ See Henri de Montéty, "Old Families and New Elite in Tunisia," in I. William Zartman, ed., *Man, State, and Society in North Africa* (New York: Praeger, forthcoming).

traditional elite and hence the composition of the Moroccan elite, whether traditional or modern, underwent little change. It could also be argued that the Moroccan graduates - with the obvious exceptions from poor families, like Abderrahim Bouabid or Mehdi Ben Barka - were less socially displaced or uprooted than most of their Algerian or Tunisian counterparts, for the Moroccans were equally at home on the traditional or modern status system. Obviously the Algerians, coming from nowhere, were the most uprooted - unless, like some, they could pass as Frenchmen. Upwardly mobile Tunisians, on the other hand, could both identify with, and react against, the traditional elite, and the confrontation would be constructive.

By 1931 there already were 151 North African students in metropolitan universities; these included 119 Tunisians but only 11 Moroccans.¹⁶ There were probably almost as many Algerian as Tunisian students in French universities if Muslims at the University of Algiers (for which no figures are available) are also counted. Morocco remained behind, for in 1955-56 there were no more than 400 Moroccan students in French universities, compared to 862 Tunisians and 1,800 Algerians.¹⁷ More significant than the absolute numbers, however, were their social origins. It is known that in 1939 only 15 out of 80 of those accepted into Tunisia's elite preparatory school, Sadiki College, come from the "old families" of Tunis, while half were upwardly mobile Sahilians.¹⁸ We assume that similar proportions prevailed among Tunisian university students. Looking at the names and addresses of the 134 Moroccans studying in French universities in 1947-48, by contrast, we see that 30 percent came from Fez, an additional 10 percent from Casablanca. We assume that most of the Casablancans (and perhaps others as well) came from commercial Fassi families which had earlier transferred their businesses to the booming French commercial capital. At least 40 percent of the student population, in short, could be classified as Fassi, while the percentage of student sons of the traditional elite was much higher. Our admittedly fragmentary evidence bears out what was clear to any observer of North African students in Paris even subsequently, in the fifties: the sharp contrast between the assiduous petit-bourgeois Tunisians and the Moroccan playboys. Without data, only impressions, it seems that the larger Algerian student body by this time displayed even greater social diversity than the Tunisians. There is one significant comparison, however, to be made between the Algerian and Tunisian student bodies. Just as half, of perhaps a majority of the Tunisians came from the Sahil, an area comprising 10 percent of the national population, so among the Algerians a disproportionate share were from Kabylia.

Indeed, primordial loyalties of sorts could strengthen the cohesion based on a shared higher education of all three modern North African elites. But whereas in Morocco the critical identification tended to be with the traditional society of Fez, the old intellectual capital as well as the source of much of the new elite, in Algeria and Tunisia the identification was with a provincial region marginal to traditional upper strata. All three modern elites had their natural social constituencies, but the Moroccan one would constrict social and political innovation, whereas Sahilians and Kabylis could share a vested interest in change. That is to say, it was easier for a Tunisian or Algerian than a Moroccan intellectual to acquire revolutionary consciousness; the old ties with Fez and upper strata kept most Moroccans back in the second movement.

¹⁶ Cited in Clement H. Moore, *Tunisia since Independence: The Dynamics of One-Party Government* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965) p. 22.

¹⁷ Clement Moore and Arlie Hochschild, "Student Unions in North African Politics," *Daedalus* (Winter 1968) p. 48.

¹⁸ Cited in Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

Yet the French educational system and pattern of primordial loyalties conspired to thwart the Algerian elite while advancing the Tunisian elite as an agency of social and political change. The government primary schools in Tunisia (as in Morocco) taught Arabic as well as French, whereas the Algerian system virtually ignored Arabic even after the Second World War (when limited concessions were made to nationalist demands). Moreover, Sadiki College, founded by a modernizing Tunisian prime minister in 1875, became the model for a special Tunisian type of secondary education, equivalent to the French lycée but including substantial Arabic studies. Thus, the modern Tunisian elite was equipped in two cultures and, unlike the Algerians, could communicate its ideas through a variety of Arabic intermediaries to the traditional society.

The intermediaries, moreover, were much weaker in Algeria than in Tunisia or, for that matter, in Morocco (where they were outlets for traditionalist intellectuals). On the one hand, the traditional educational system destroyed by the French in Algeria endured in the Protectorates. The Qarawiyyin University at Fez and the University of Zitouna at Tunis continued to dispense a medieval Islamic education. Indeed, though moribund when the French came --- Qarawiyyin had roughly 300 students, Zitouna less than a thousand --- these venerable institutions, including their secondary level annexes, were schooling respectively 3,000 and 15,000 students by the mid-1950s. And linking in some degree the traditional Arabic with modern forms of instruction were the so-called "free schools" in Morocco and the "Quranic schools" in Tunisia. The Tunisian desire, expressed earlier by the founding of Sadiki College, to modernize while retaining an Arabic culture, led by 1906 to the founding of these private, predominantly Arabic primary schools preparing children to enter a modern secondary school. By 1955 almost 35,000 Tunisians --- one-fifth of those in school --- were attending these schools, which French educational authorities officially inspected and recognized. The "free school" movement in Morocco was comparable but originated later and was less extensive, schooling only 20,000 children in 1954. Politically, however, these intermediaries were very important as links through their schoolteachers with the nationalist elites. Their equivalents in Algeria, launched in 1912 and subsequently made famous by Ben Badis (see below), were more significant for the history of Algerian nationalism but schooled only 7,000 children in 1951.¹⁹

The primordial affiliations of the major part of the Algerian elite also hindered its ability to communicate with Algerian society. For Kabyles, however modernized or "socially mobilized" they might be, in comparison with the rest of the Algerian population, were a linguistic minority, native Berber-speakers who, for the most part, did not speak the language of three-quarters of the country. However nationalist, however concerned for Algeria, not Kabylia, the French-educated elite (and indeed other "mobilized" strata) from this region might be, they could not represent and articulate the values of the rest of the nation, except so far as these values could be expressed in French. In Tunisia, by contrast, primordial ties could be the building blocks of national solidarity. Though his accent was distinctive, like a Yankee drawl, the Sahilian spoke and thought in Arabic as well as French and could therefore represent, in the sense of articulating the values for, a new Tunisian nation.

Indeed only in Tunisia was there a core group marginal, unlike the Fassis, to the traditional elite yet available and culturally capable of providing the sense of purpose for a new, nationwide

¹⁹ For Tunisia, see Leon Carl Brown, "Tunisia," in James S. Coleman, ed., *Education and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) p. 151. For Morocco see Albert Ayache, *Le Maroc* (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1956) p. 320. For Algeria, see "Etudes du Secrétariat Social d'Alger," *Construire la Cité: l'Algérie et sa jeunesse* (Algiers: Editions du Secrétariat Social d'Alger, 1957) p. 88.

political space. The Sahil, in the restricted sense used in this chapter, is a concentrated cluster of villages and towns one hundred miles south of Tunis extending forty miles along the eastern coastline and up to twenty miles inland. Like Upper Kabylia and parts of the Berber Atlas in Morocco, its olive orchards were not enough to support a dense and growing population. For French settlers, too, it was a peripheral area. (The twocolons [settlers] who tried to establish themselves eventually departed.) The Sahil peasant jealously guarded his private property, though it might not consist of more than a few olive trees. A segmentary pattern of intra- and intervillage rivalries existed here as elsewhere in North Africa, but the Sahil, though geographically more vulnerable than the Berber strongholds, had managed for centuries to protect its orchards from the nomads of the interior. What made the Sahil unique in North Africa was not its sedentary village life but the fact that its peasants also spoke Arabic, historically had been open to various currents of Mediterranean civilization yet would, like Kabyle peasants, be especially attracted to French education. Though disdained as country folk by the refined upper classes of Tunis, educated Sahilians would be able to assimilate some of their manners and eventually, successful in modern careers, marry their daughters as well as take over the country. While Kabyles could not absorb Arabs, Sahilians absorbed other Tunisians.

The Sahil, Kabylia, and Fez would be the core constituencies of the respective nationalist movements, just as they provided primordial bases of cohesion for the new elites. But to mention the key constituencies --- the natural "audiences" for nationalist elites --- is to introduce another set of variables conditioning the colonial dialectic; the largely unintended consequences of colonial policies which detached non-elite strata from traditional society and made them "available" for nationalist activity.

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

In all three societies the French presence induced what Karl Deutsch calls "social mobilization," or "the process in which major cluster of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."²⁰ The critical precipitating factors were education and the creation of modern economic sectors juxtaposed to traditional subsistence economies. Mass primary education, with concomitant increases in literacy and social communications, created new native audiences susceptible to elite appeals. The colonial economies uprooted millions and made them "available for new patterns" that the colonial power often could not provide. A constructive colonial dialectic, however, is not necessarily facilitated by high indices, in the abstract, of "social mobilization." Rather, what is crucial is who gets "mobilized," that is, detached from the usual order of things, and in what respect. Are the detached strata available to the articulators of the dialectic, that is, to the modern intelligentsia, or do they threaten to swamp the new elite and hence jeopardize the possibilities of a dialectical confrontation with the colonial power?

Comparative analysis suggests that there was too much social mobilization in Algeria and not enough in Morocco. The uprooting in Algeria began earliest, and the modern economy was least capable of absorbing the rural exodus of dispossessed peasants. In these respects Tunisia occupied a middle ground. Moreover, a greater proportion of Tunisians than either Algerians or Moroccans received primary school education. This meant that more modern intermediaries would

²⁰ Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe) p. 583.

be available in Tunisia to link the intellectual elites and uprooted masses. Rather than compare indices of social mobilization in the abstract (such as degree of urbanization, literacy, nonagricultural employment, or news media), it is necessary to discern and compare the processes of social mobilization, their discontinuities as well as continuities, in the three colonial situations.

Stimulated by dynamic European entrepreneurs with generous supplies of foreign private capital, Morocco, the late developer, caught up with Algeria after an industrial "boom" in 1948-1953. By 1955, in fact, Moroccan production in the primary and secondary sectors of the economy (that is, agriculture, mines, energy, industry, construction) exceeded Algeria's. The Moroccan economy had grown at an average annual rate of 3.7 percent since 1920, whereas the older colonial economies had "peaked" earlier and could no longer keep up with the growth of the native Algerian and Tunisian populations. By 1955, 600,000 Moroccans were employed in nonagricultural and for the most part, modern occupations, compared to only 460,000 Algerian Muslims and 210,000 Tunisians.²¹ Table II.1, which gives the

TABLE II.1 Percentages of Muslims in 1955 by Economic Sector

Sector	Algeria	Tunisia	Morocco
Primary (agriculture)	78%	71%	60%
Secondary	12.5	11	23
Tertiary (services)	9.5	18	17

Source: René Gallissot, *L'Economie de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961), p. 77.

percentages of Muslims employed in each economic sector, also indicates that Algerians experiences the greatest difficulty, Moroccans the least, in being integrated into the modern economy. That is, a greater proportion of Algerians remained in the "primary sector" of traditional agriculture, whereas the modern secondary and tertiary sectors were more open to the Tunisians and especially the Moroccans. Indeed, Muslim nonagricultural unemployment, 5 to 10 percent in Morocco, ranged from 10 to 20 percent in Tunisia and 25 to 33 percent in Algeria.²² One reason for this, obviously, was that Algeria's much larger settler population included many petit blancs occupying jobs the Muslims could take in Tunisia and especially Morocco, where there were proportionately fewest settlers.

Yet, ironically, the modern economy most capable of absorbing surplus Muslim labor from the countryside supported the rural society least disturbed by the French presence. Foreigners appropriated proportionately the least arable land in Morocco, and official efforts to preserve tribal structure were the most successful. Rural proletarianization, the consequence in Tunisia and especially in Algeria of policies encouraging European settlement, did not occur to any such extent in Morocco. More than one-half of the Moroccan rural population in 1955 could be considered

²¹ Samir Amin, *L'Economie du Maghreb* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1966) I, 172, 156, 166.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 171.

relatively well off by North African standards, earning an annual \$400 or better per family from their farming. By contrast, in Tunisia rather less than half (40 percent) earned only \$300 or better, while in Algeria only one quarter of the native rural population enjoyed relatively satisfactory incomes.²³

But of course under the twin pressures of colonization and a population explosion, the rural populations suffered in all three countries. As they were squeezed off their traditional lands, Muslims sought jobs on European farms or in the mines; they also invaded the new European cities, thereby coming into contact with modern life, becoming "socially mobilized," even when they could not find steady jobs. Though the process of rural proletarianization began earlier in Algeria and Tunisia than in Morocco, the exodus en masse to the cities began at about the same time, after 1930, in all three countries. From 1936 to 1948 alone, Algerian cities received a net influx of one-half million. From 1936 to 1952, one million rural Moroccans were on the move, two-thirds of them to the cities, the remainder to rural centers of colonization. From 1936 to 1946, more than 150,000 Tunisians flocked to the capital. Alongside all of North Africa's major cities miserable shantytowns (the so-called bidonvilles, or towns built of tin cans) mushroomed and housed up to two-fifths (Algiers, 1954) of the Muslim urban populations. Meanwhile the impoverished rural populations continued to increase in absolute numbers despite the massive exodus.

Abstractly speaking, and confining our attention strictly to what was happening in North Africa proper, Moroccans would appear between 1930 and 1955 to have been more socially mobilized than either the Algerians or Tunisians. For during this period the proportion of Moroccans in cities almost quadrupled, while the others little more than doubled.²⁴ By 1955 one-fifth of the native Moroccan population lived in cities of over 20,000 inhabitants; this was a slightly higher proportion than either Algeria or Tunisia could boast (though in the succeeding ten years of revolution and independence both countries would outstrip Morocco). Similarly abstract indices of nonagricultural employment showed Moroccans to be more mobilized than either the Algerians or Tunisians. But in the politically significant sense of being available for new kinds of nonprofessional activity, the Moroccans remained backward, and political development lagged behind economic development. For most of the urbanized Moroccans had jobs to go to, unlike their Tunisian and especially Algerian counterparts. Moreover, the Moroccans, urbanized more recently, retained stronger attachments to their traditional structures in the countryside.

In fact, French sociologist and political consultant Robert Montagne, writing just before the Protectorate in Morocco ended, suggested the possibility of creating ethnic quarters in the coastal cities, to serve as a social "brake" easing the transition of the new proletariat to city life.²⁵ And indeed the Moroccan workers, whether or not they brought their families with them, generally retained their primordial loyalties to a greater extent than their Tunisian or Algerian counterparts, even though, as elsewhere, the colonial authorities failed to control social change. Moroccan trade unionism developed much later than its equivalents in Tunisia and Algeria. Moreover, the majority of the new Moroccan working force were of Berber origin, from the Sous and the surrounding slopes of the High Atlas and Anti-Atlas, and hence relatively immune, until political crises of the early fifties, to the nationalist appeals of the Fassi political elite. Politically the Moroccan Berbers

²³ Amin. *op. cit.*, pp. 130, 136, 141.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

²⁵ Robert Montagne, *La Naissance du prolétariat marocain* (Paris: J. Peyronnet, 1951) p. 259. (Cahiers de l'Afrique et de l'Asie, III.)

were less significant than Algerian Kabyles, even though Berbers constituted a larger percentage of the total population in Morocco (40 percent) than in Algeria (25 percent) or Tunisia (1 percent).²⁶ The urban Arabs generally regarded the Berbers as ignorant rustics. Though they had a head start over the Arabs in joining the urban proletariat, Moroccan Berbers did not, unlike Kabyles, enjoy a similar educational advantage. Furthermore, the traditional Arab elites retained their status and sense of identity in Morocco. Hence, during the struggle for independence, no coalition materialized between third-moment intellectual (who were also for the most part Arab) and the new proletariat. Social mobilization did not lead to political mobilization until just before independence, when no elite could channel it.

In Algeria, by contrast, the process of social mobilization occurred over a longer time and was more painful, in that fewer jobs were available. By 1905 some uprooted Algerian peasants were already working in southern France; by 1913, according to an official survey, four to five thousand were working in the factories of Marseilles and Paris and in mines near the Belgian border. Virtually all were Kabyles, squeezed as they had been, even before 1830, out of their poor, overpopulated mountain villages. Kabyles had also sought out jobs in the nineteenth century in colon settlements, as agricultural workers, petty tradesmen, or semiskilled laborers. The Arabs usually distrusted these itinerant single men, who left their families at home and rarely fused with the Arab populations they visited. More mobile than the Arabs, they also tended to assimilate modern skills more rapidly --- out of economic necessity. Indeed, a recent book, *L'Algérie kabylisée*, describes their subsequent take-over of most strategic sectors of the modern Muslim economy --- civil service, teaching, skilled labor, etc.²⁷

Before independence, however, many other Algerians were socially mobilized, in that they had to escape a rural overpopulation and underemployment which the colonial situation had generalized. By 1955 at least half of Algeria's modern work force was in France, and Kabyles, though still the most distinctive segment, constituted less than half of these temporary emigrés. Including its workers in France, Algeria was clearly more socially mobilized, as measured by urbanization and nonagricultural employment, than either Morocco or Tunisia. Moreover, the Kabyle masses, activated and mobilized over a long period of time, were potential audiences for revolutionary Kabyle intellectuals. But, unfortunately, enough other Algerians were also mobilized to challenge Kabyle predominance. Indeed, there were too many uprooted, mobilized Algerians, scattered between Algeria and France, for any intellectual elite to control. Social mobilization outran the political capacities of the elite long before independence.

Only in Tunisia, apparently, was there enough social mobilization to make mass support available to a radical elite, yet not so much as to ensure anarchic revolts against it. In terms of urbanization and nonagricultural employment, Tunisia lagged slightly behind the two larger countries by 1955, compared to about 15 percent of the Algerians and 11 percent of the Moroccans.²⁸ A proletariat had been developing in the modern colonial sectors of the economy since the turn of the century. Its primordial ties were weaker than those of the newer Moroccan proletariat; indeed, Tunisians had been actively involved in trade unions since the twenties. Many of the proletariat came from tribes of the center and south, relatively few from the Sahil.

²⁶ Despois, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

²⁷ See Jean Morizot, *L'Algérie kabylisée* (Paris: J. Peyronnet, 1962)

²⁸ For Tunisia, see Salah-Eddine Tlatli, *Tunisie nouvelle: problèmes et perspectives* (Tunis, 1957) p. 234. For Algeria, see "Etudes du Secrétariat Social d'Alger," *op. cit.*, p. 74. For Morocco, see Ladislav Cerych, *Européens et Marocains 1930-1956: Sociologie d'une décolonisation* (Bruges: De Tempel, 1964) p. 298.

Primordial links made it "available" to third-moment intellectuals only in the same sense that both workers and intellectuals share a similar marginal status vis-à-vis the traditional elite of Tunis. Had there been a greater social mobilization in Tunisia, the proletarian strata might have endangered the Sahil's hegemony in the nationalist movement. But, strengthened by a national vision and educational advantages, Sahilians retained control (and of course recruited leaders from other regions as well). Ironically even the head of the trade unions in 1956 was a French university graduate from the Sahil (Ahemd Ben Salah). Only in Tunisia could the intellectuals, drawing cohesion and support from a primordial core, guide and channel the process of social mobilization induced by the French. Social changes in the first century of colonial Algeria had been too profound, painful, and uneven for its intellectuals to channel, while the mobilization in Morocco had been too recent to provide a reservoir of support to radical intellectuals (who, anyway, were not numerous).

CONFLICT SITUATIONS

The final set of critical factors conditioning dialectical evolution concerns the nature of the conflict with the colonial power. If the conflict is protracted, there is more time for radical intellectuals to outdistance and incorporate earlier moments of nationalist consciousness and to articulate a new political design in a durable organization. In this respect Algeria and Tunisia had the advantage over Morocco, where urban nationalism did not become a significant political force until the Second World War. France gave up Morocco before colonial conflict could generate a radical take-over of the nationalist movement. But the style of conflict is a significant as its duration. Only when the conflict encourages an articulation of national values does it become a dialectical confrontation, one building the "identity in opposition" characteristic of the Hegelian paradigm. Widespread violence, however, rules out articulation. For violence undermines the leadership of the intellectuals, the articulators of dialect, unless they already, like the Vietnamese, control an organizational weapon. In Algeria a tradition of violence and colonial repression had devaluated intellectuals and their organizational skills. Frantz Fanon condemns their compromises with colonialism. Only in less violent, more "political" conflicts --- as in colonial Tunisia --- are their skills essential. The French stakes in Algeria were too high, settler influence too pervasive, to permit the "political" kind of confrontation.

The settlers were the de facto rulers of Algeria, whereas they were at best a powerful pressure group in the Protectorates. Settlers controlled the Algerian administration, for high officials tended to make lifelong careers in the country. The administration depended not, as in Morocco and Tunisia, upon the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs but upon the Ministry of the Interior (until 1956). Through the *Délégations Financières* (1900-1945) and then the Algerian Assembly, the settlers wielded decisive influence upon the Algerian budget. In the *communes de plein exercice* (local governing bodies) they had three-quarters of the seats. Their deputies in Paris could block political reforms against all but the strongest French governments; after Georges Clemenceau's reforms of 1919 no government excepting those of Charles de Gaulle had the strength or will to stand up to the settlers. The crucial blow to moderate Algerian politicians came in 1937, when settlers successfully blocked the Blum-Viollette reforms, which offered the Muslim majority the prospect in the very distant future of having a decisive voice in domestic affairs. Perhaps no dialectic was possible after this date. For Muslims did not have political allies, or even sympathetic adversaries, among the predominantly lower-class, racist settler population. Even the Algerian Communist Party, consisting mostly of Europeans, supported a bloody suppression in

1945 of the Constantine uprising. In this anomic outburst of native frustration, more than one hundred Europeans were killed, but some six thousand Muslims (the estimates vary) lost their lives in the blind reprisals which set the stage for subsequent violence.²⁹ Widespread electoral fraud perpetrated by the Algerian administration destroyed any chance of applying timid reforms promised by the Algerian Statute of 1947. As classic methods of effecting political change proved ineffective, Algerian intellectuals committed to these methods lost their prestige and ability to canalize mass protest.

By contrast, in Tunisia and Morocco a political process was possible. To be sure, the settlers, as in Algeria, opposed reforms allowing greater Muslim participation and acquired important allies in the Protectorate administration. But the weak governments of the Fourth Republic nevertheless retained some margin for maneuver in these countries. Though the settlers usually in the end sabotaged the policies of liberal Resident Generals whom French governments occasionally appointed, reformists could boast of temporary victories even before 1954-1955. In Tunisia under the supervision of the Popular Front government in Paris, 1936 and 1937 were years of conciliation and compromise with nationalist forces. So also in 1945-1950, some political negotiations were possible. In Morocco, too, despite periods of police repression as in Tunisia, there were periods of compromise and dialogue with nationalist forces. On occasion, as in 1950, nationalist leader like Bourguiba and Mohammed V were received in Paris. Tunisian and Moroccan politicians never lost hope in getting hearing at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and influencing French public opinion through sympathetic metropolitan politicians like Pierre Mendès-France or Edgar Faure. Those North Africans most suitable for these diplomatic tasks, of course, were the intellectuals, graduates of French universities.

The ambiguity of the political formula of the protectorate was an asset Algerians did not have. Realizing the dangers of the ambiguity --- even though after the days of Marshal Lyautey it was never French policy to train a native elite for self-government as the British agreed to do after 1943 in some of their African colonies --- the settlers attempted to revise the formula, to develop "Franco-Moroccan" and "Franco-Tunisian" sovereignty. Thus both sides, not just the Muslim nationalists, were attempting to the status quo. Despite their influence upon some French administrators of the Protectorates, the settlers were in a weaker position than their counterparts in Algeria. Settlers and nationalists competed for concessions from the government in Paris.

The fact that nationalists could not effect significant change within the structures of their respective Protectorates --- for indirect rule was subverted and consultative bodies favored the settler --- encourage them to organize instruments of action, such as political parties, outside the legal framework. In two important respects, however, the conflict situations in Morocco and Tunisia differed. One difference, as noted above, was timing. With roots antedating the First World War, Tunisian nationalism was older than its Moroccan equivalent, and the political conflict began in earnest in 1920. Nothing comparable occurred in Morocco until 1936 (earlier flurries resembled, in the number of Moroccans they involved, the happenings in Tunis between 1906 and 1912). Furthermore, the political styles of the settler population differed, explaining in part (as dialectical analysis would suggest) the difference in style of their adversaries.

The settler population had been established for a longer time in Tunisia and tended to be of lower socioeconomic status, both by origins and income, than its Moroccan counterparts. Therefore highly developed in Tunisia. The chief spokesman for the settlers in the last years of French rule here was a former petty administrator (appropriately named Colonna) who had

²⁹ For a detailed report, see Robert Aron, *Les Origines de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris; Fayard, 1962) pp. 117-42.

organized white-collar workers, whereas his counterpart in Morocco was a wealthy landowner. The Tunis section of the French Socialist Party (SFIO) was also an important influence on nationalists. Though always small in numbers, it dated from the twenties and, as Carl Brown points out, argued with and helped politically to socialize influential segments of the Muslim elite (including Habib Bourguiba).³⁰ Fascist methods of mass organization, imported by a substantial Italian settler population, were likewise a suggestive political model. Thus university graduates were exposed to modern ideas and styles of mass political participation not only abroad, where they looked to French parties of the Left, but also when they returned home. In Tunisia the mass organizations of the settlers posed concrete threats to the nationalists as well as models to emulate. Nationalists had to demonstrate to French public opinion that Mr. Colonna was not the only one who could mobilize masses for the revision of the political status quo.

In Morocco, by contrast, the most influential settlers were wealthy landowners and financiers enjoying international connections. They acted not like mass pressure groups but rather as individuals exercising influence through personal contacts behind the scenes. Trade unions and sections of metropolitan political parties tended to be less active and visible in Morocco than in Tunisia. Hence the Moroccan nationalists were not as exposed as the Tunisians to the more modern styles of mass politics. It was enough to operate in a similarly exclusive world of traditional families. The elitist style of settler politics long after Lyautey's departure probably helped to perpetuate the monarchy, though not in the way the Marshal had intended. The settlers' style, which encouraged the development of a third moment in Tunisia, helped to block it in Morocco.

To summarize our discussion, the circumstances of the French presence were more conducive in Tunisia than elsewhere to a constructive conflict engendering new bases of social and political cohesion. Algeria experienced too much social disruption and a conflict too violent to promote new elites capable of reknitting the many and varied segments of its society. Morocco, on the other hand, was too lightly touched for conflict basically to transform the old patrimonial structure and its segmental underpinnings. Tunisia was the most fortunate, in retrospect, because the French presence did not, as in Algeria, eradicate the traditional elites who were the carriers of Tunisia's past, yet it provided favorable circumstances for the new elite to displace the old and reinterpret its values and practices in light of modern European models.

NATIONALISM AND "NATION-BUILDING"

If the colonial situations produced nationalist elites and potential audiences of socially mobilized masses, it was the inevitable set of conflicts between colonizer and colonized that allowed new possibilities for the latter to define new public purposes and to institutionalize them in political organizations. Sociological generalizations cannot fully explain why this conflict was most constructive in Tunisia, where a political party expressed and crystallized the radical consciousness of a new elite, or least constructive in Algeria, where no legitimate organization was generated, or useful for sustaining and reinvigorating a traditional monarchy in Morocco. One can only report, briefly, what happened, that is, the consequences of a colonial dialectic or an aborted dialectic for political development.

³⁰ For the best analysis of the impact of French socialism upon Tunisian nationalism, see L. Carl Brown, "Tunisia under the French Protectorate: A History of Ideological Change" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1962), as summarized in "Stages in the Process of Change: A Theoretical Model," in Charles A. Micaud, et al., *Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization* (New York: Praeger, 1964) pp. 48-52.

Tunisia: Reason and Revolution. In the Tunisian Protectorate a colonial dialectic fully unfolded: Young Tunisians before the First World War played out the game of liberal assimilationism, forever discrediting this mode of consciousness without precluding an eventual synthesis. After the war, the second moment of traditionalist anti-colonialism held sway under the aegis of the Old Destour in 1934 --- a movement led by an elite able to synthesize the modes of consciousness of preceding political generations into a genuine identity in opposition to colonial power.

At the turn of the century the Young Tunisians founded modern Tunisian nationalism. They were, for the most part, sons of the Turkish mameluke aristocracy which had ruled Tunisia before the French came. Many were among the tiny elite graduated by Sadiki College. While founding a party and a newspaper, *Le Tunisien*, in 1907, their concerns were more cultural and economic than strictly political. In the tradition of Kheireddine, the founder of Sadiki, and inspired by the Young Turks of the decaying Ottoman Empire, their goal was to make Tunisia modern. As one of them put it, "The Muslims of Tunisia are indolent, improvident, and fatalistic. They must be prodded into activity."³¹ These French-educated Tunisians were unabashedly elitist, as the "they" suggests. They readily identified with liberal French Resident Generals and with the strands of French public opinion that took France's mission civilisatrice seriously. They accepted the Protectorate wholeheartedly, and even its policies of official colonization insofar as Tunisians, too, might be taught modern farming methods. They were "liberal", of course, not in the sense of advocating *laissez-faire* --- indeed, they wanted strong, paternal government --- but in the sense of being heirs of the Enlightenment, believers in progress through the development of man's reasoning capacities. Hence, they placed their faith in modern education, and by "modern" they meant predominantly French education, not a patched-up curriculum of Islamic studies. As early as 1896, with the support of the French Resident, some of the future Young Tunisians who in 1906 founded the first modern Quranic school in North Africa. But the thrust of the movement was to urge the government to establish more Franco-Arab schools, for the leading Young Tunisian, Ali Bach Hamba, feared that any lesser steps would perpetuate Muslim backwardness.

The group was "liberal" in a second, equally important sense. "Let us talk as Tunisians and not as Muslims or Jews," wrote Bach Hamba. "The time of confessional distinctions is past. It is the task of the young generations to work that they be completely forgotten."³² The Young Tunisians had assimilated the French conception of a secular political community. They implicitly made a distinction between religious matters and the cultural, economic, and political affairs which interested them. Islam was essentially irrelevant. While the Young Tunisians wisely avoided a frontal assault on the conservative ulama, some, if pressed, would have identified with the French anti-clerical Left.

But the Young Tunisians of course remained a very exclusive elite group; the party never claimed a membership of more than 1,500, and, as Brown points out, "Most of [their] activities and writings . . . can be traced to about a dozen persons."³³ Though not isolated from their society, in that they all belonged to leading families and were well received, too, by early French

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.35.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 23. for the most recent scholarly account of the Young Tunisians, see Charles-André Julien, "Colons français et Jeunes-Tunisians, 1882-1912," *Revue Française d'Histoire d'Outre-mer*, LIX (1967) 87-150.

administrators, they had no roots among the Tunisians they wished to educate. When Muslim masses in Tunis did become agitated, after Italy took over Libya in 1911, four of the leading Young Tunisians were deported because of their protests over the handling of a minor incident.

A juncture between elite and other strata had to await the conclusion of the First World War, the dissemination of Wilsonian ideas of national self-determination, and the return to Tunisia of almost one hundred thousand demobilized soldiers and workers. In 1920 the Young Tunisians, who now, no longer so young, called themselves simply the Parti Tunisien, merged into a more broadly based force, the Liberal Constitutional Party (Destour), under the leadership of Sheikh Abdelaziz Taalbi. There were some continuities with the prewar party. Taalbi himself had been a Young Tunisian in charge of the Arabic press; though he had been trained at Zitouna the conservative ulama expelled him for a book advocating the reform of Islam along lines suggested by the Salafiyya movement in Egypt. Some of his associates in the Destour were French-educated veterans of the older party. But most of the secular modernists subsequently joined another party, encouraged by Protectorate authorities, which had little impact upon Tunisian opinion. The Destour marked a new moment in Tunisian nationalism, that of traditionalistic anti-colonialism.

Taalbi had been less concerned with modernizing Tunisia than with using modern ideas to reform Islam. His second book, *La Tunisie martyre*, was a polemic against the Protectorate which oriented the new party to the specifically political task of altering the colonial condition. Delegations were sent to Paris; Taalbi himself was briefly jailed; political manifestations occurred at home; like the Egyptian Wafd, the Destour rapidly acquired a mass following both in Tunis and the Sahil. For a time in the early twenties it was fashionable for almost everybody to be in the party.

The ostensible goal of the Destour was to persuade France to grant Tunisia a constitution that would permit an elected Tunisian parliament (with some settler representation). Consulted by the party, a couple of French lawyers concluded in 1921 that such a demand was compatible with maintaining the Protectorate. Tunisian independence was never mentioned. but the underlying attitude of the Destour, as expressed in *La Tunisie martyre*, was one of total rejection and all its innovation. The authors resorted to the myth of Tunisia's precolonial past, now imagined to have been a golden age of piety and learning. The French were attacked not only for having expropriated land but for having introduced a French educational system when a national as well as scientific education was needed. Taalbi and his followers affirmed what Ali Bach Hamba had rejected, that modern sciences could be assimilated in Arabic, that French culture was basically superfluous. And while their formal demands were couched in the language of Western liberalism, their inspiration was essentially Islamic. Behind the glories they extolled of precolonial Tunisia lay nostalgia for Islamic grandeur. They represented a popular reaction, that of withdrawing from French influence and asserting traditional religious values. The secularizing tendencies of the Young Tunisians were submerged in anti-colonial protest.

But the Destour was ineffective. Its united call for a constitution masked significant differences in outlook among its leaders. All were either *mameluke* or *baldi*, that is, traditional urban notables including sheikhs from Zitouna. But the French-educated lawyers who pleaded the Destour's case in Paris were joined only by common family ties and distrust of the Protectorate to the religious figures who swayed the masses. Hence the party's underlying conservatism and its legalistic style, the only sort of politics possible in the absence of a deeper mode of nationalist consciousness. When by 1923 it was clear that France was not going to grant Tunisia a constitution, the lawyers could only rest their "case." Taalbi departed on a long pilgrimage to the Orient. He persisted but refused in 1925 even to support the first indigenous efforts to create an

exclusively Tunisian trade union. Rejecting all compromise with the Protectorate, the notables remained "pure" and intransigent but utterly inactive, despairing of all progress once their objective could not be achieved.

Habib Bourguiba and his generation, trained in French universities in the twenties, represented a new mode of nationalist consciousness. They inherited from the Young Tunisians an abiding faith in liberal France and in its economic and cultural innovations, while from the old Destour they stole the banner of anti-colonialism. What they reacted against was not the French presence as such but rather the relationship of subordination it implied. More explicitly than the Young Tunisians they stressed the idea of a Tunisian patrie, a nation in which confessional considerations were irrelevant, but frankly recognized that such a nation did not exist. It had to be brought into existence. How? Bourguiba pushed the tutelary views of the Young Tunisians one step further by equating education with sustained political activity. His radicalized generation viewed politics no longer as a series of disconnected arguments but as pedagogy. Inculcating faith in a new nation was more important than the record in the courtroom, for history, they believed, was on the side of the new believers. In fact the Neo-Destour's courtroom became an open schoolhouse for Tunisia's political edification; Bourguiba never lost sight of a primary purpose in his struggles with France: to provide a scenario including spectator participation.

To acquire mass support in a conservative Islamic society, the new generation could not skirt the religious issues as had the Young Tunisians. Rather Islam was affirmed as an integral but in the last analysis subordinate, aspect of national culture. The autobiography of one of Bourguiba's associates, Tahar Sfar,³⁴ shows a deeply personal appreciation of religion which is very Western and secular in its approach. Publicly, however, they could without hypocrisy stand as Islam's most energetic defenders. In 1929 Bourguiba defended the custom of veiling women against progressive European critics. He did not appeal to tradition but rather, anticipating Frantz Fanon, to the need for protecting symbols of Tunisia's national identity. In 1932, while still members of the Old Destour, the young group brashly seized upon a real issue, whether Muslims who had been naturalized as Frenchmen could be buried in Muslim cemeteries. While their older leaders hedged, they sparked a newspaper campaign against such burials, on the ground that naturalization had required renouncing the shari'a (corpus of Islamic law) for the French civil code. Their real aim was to deter Tunisians from giving up their nationality, but in the public eye it was thus the radical elite which staunchly defended religion, not the muftis and sheikhs who officially pronounced that naturalized Frenchmen remained Muslim and could be buried as such. (Eventually the Protectorate authorities had to give way to popular pressure and create special cemeteries for the few thousand potential cases.) While subordinating religion to nation, the young activists appropriated the symbols of Islam. As Jacques Berque put it, Islam, no longer a refuge, became a "Jacobin Islam" liberated from its traditional trustees, the ulama.³⁵ Faith transplanted from formal religion became a shared sense of national mission orchestrated by a new party.

The so-called "Neo-Destour" Party was founded March 5, 1934, at Ksar-Hellal, a village in the heart of the Sahil, the region from which most of the new leaders came. Originally just a splinter group contesting the leadership of the older party, it rapidly captured much of the Old Destour's organized support. The young leaders --- Bourguiba was now just thirty --- did not hesitate to tour the countryside spreading their message; for them unlike the older generation,

³⁴ Tahar Sfar, *Journal d'un exilé* (Tunis, 1960).

³⁵ Jacques Berque, *Le Maghreb entre deux guerres* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1962) pp. 70-75.

politics was a full-time profession. In the difficult summer of 1934, when some tribes were threatened with famine, the Neo-Destour urged its supporters to boycott French goods and to refuse to pay their taxes. Outbidding the older party's intransigence, the young leaders refused to cooperate with the Resident General by participating in his study commissions for reform. Finally, in early September, the Resident cut short the political agitation by arresting eight Neo-Destour leaders, along with six Communists. This gave Bourguiba his first chance to be a national martyr; when he was freed in 1936, his prestige reached a new peak. And when Taalbi returned in the summer of 1937 from his extended fourteen-year pilgrimage in the Orient, the new party held firm. Though Taalbi was a spellbinding orator, the Neo-Destour was sufficiently strong to stir masses in the provinces against the old leader and discredit him when he tried to unify the Destours under his own leadership. Taalbi's orientation had become obsolete in rapidly changing Tunisia.

Usually the Neo-Destour insisted that its goals and aspirations were the same as the older party's, that what differentiated the two groups was political tactics. The older leadership was passive and intransigent while the younger leadership was more dynamic, flexible in its tactics, more capable of achieving results from its confrontations and negotiations with the French authorities. Thus "Bourguibism," as Bourguiba explains it, is primarily a tactic for wresting concessions from an adversary. And it was true in the two decades before independence that the Neo-Destour occasionally reached compromises with the French authorities and had to justify them to anti-colonialist opinion. But the older leadership in similar circumstances would have been equally "flexible" in Levantine political negotiations. The two groups differed not so much in tactics as in fundamental orientations.

The basic difference was that the new party considered that a Tunisian nation had to be created, whereas the old party took for granted that the traditional social structure already constituted a nation. The older generation, after all, was incapable of subjecting its own social to rational criticism. The young sons of the Sahil, on the other hand, did not share the baldi's stake in the order. While expressing colonial grievances to the French, the Neo-Destour simultaneously marshaled the new social forces created by the Protectorate. For this double task European models of political organization were extremely relevant. A highly organized mass party was needed, not only as a weapon against colonial domination but as the instrument of nation-building. Discipline, too, was needed if Bourguiba was to keep aroused Muslim masses from falling under Taalbi's influence. But above all, since politics was pedagogy, a network of communication was needed within which Bourguiba might exercise his powers of rational persuasion, explain his political positions, and induce traditionally rival segments to merge their identities in a larger whole.

By 1937 the Neo-Destour had about 28,000 members organized in more than four hundred branches throughout Tunisian civil territory (excluding the military regions of the South).³⁶ Most of its strength was concentrated along the eastern coast, especially in the provinces of Cap Bon, Tunis, and Sousse. The formal structure resembled that of the French Socialist Party. The party's main strength, however, lay not so much in its organization --- the leaders would never be able to duplicate the elaborate French Communist model --- as in the types of activists it recruited. At the lower echelons many were graduates or teachers of modern Quranic schools or Zitouna and therefore able by virtue of their traditional learning to acquire the respect of a mass following. They constituted the crucial intermediaries between the French-educated national leaders and the conservative society. Perhaps Bourguiba's greatest quality as a leader was his ability to transmit his own dedication and enthusiasm to the cadres.

³⁶ Henri de Montety's estimate, cited by Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

Driven underground from 1938 to 1942, the party managed to survive even when all its top leaders were jailed. Again from 1952 to 1954, when the party underwent a third wave of repression, it survived. Bourguiba spent a total of ten years in jail. But colonial repression seems to have been just enough to enhance the party's cohesion and authenticate its nationalist credentials without being so severe as to discourage the activists and destroy the organization. Violent demonstrations and police brutality never escalated to a point of no return; it was always possible for the party to control the activities of its following. Thus rallies, demonstrations, and even the acts of sabotage undertaken in 1953 and 1954, while serving as expressions of national solidarity, were always geared to the political end of inducing the French authorities to negotiate on terms favorable to the Neo-Destour.

The intricate story of the party's struggle to obtain Tunisian independence need not concern us here. What was significant was that the party had twenty-two years, from 1936 to 1956, in which to educate a new Tunisian public sharing common symbols and experiences, especially those of the leader-hero Bourguiba. In 1959 he could say without too much exaggeration,

It is rare that the events that make up the landmarks in the life of one man are integrated into the history of a people to such an extent that the man seems to incarnate his whole people. If this transposition has been brought about, it is because the man was able to be the sincere and disinterested spokesman of the nation's conscience, and because he fought so much and so well for the people's cause that the movements in the life of each were brought to merge with one another.³⁷

Bourguiba in fact successfully portrayed the drama of a nation that did not yet exist. With brilliant theatrical skill, he captured his audience, riveted its attention upon his trials and tribulations and brought it to believe that it shared the same stage.

The sense of a public interest was new in the Maghrib. If Bourguiba was its chief articulator, the party was its institutional embodiment. To become a militant took courage. It also meant breaking with other loyalties or subordinating them, at least, to the common cause. In its twenty-two years of gestation the party was able to shape new personalities not isolated, to be sure, from other social influences but marked by a new sense of dedication and a belief in progress. Destourians who did not know one another could identify one another by the implicit cues that shared experience in the party provided. At the root of the new Destourian personality, perhaps, lay a religious quality which had become politicized and secularized. But any Tunisian Muslim could become a "good militant" by the party's concrete, if intuitive, standards. Unlike the Young Tunisians, the French university graduates of Bourguiba's and subsequent generations were not elitists, at least not intentionally.

The party rode the crest of the social changes wrought by the colonial situation. In addition to peasants from the Sahil and elsewhere --- and even bedouin tribes --- it recruited from all sectors of the modern urban economy, especially in the lower middle class and proletarian suburbs of Tunis which were swamping the central median inhabited by the baldi. In 1954, just before its victory was assured, the party already had more than one hundred thousand members. Its most useful new recruits were the newer generations of French-educated secondary school and university graduates, who themselves increasingly represented a cross-section of Tunisian society. By

³⁷ Speech, June 1, 1959, cited in *ibid.*, p. 46.

independence the party enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the professional skills available in Tunisia for running the administrations the French would vacate. Most important, its victory gave it legitimacy in the eyes of most Tunisians, while the very longevity of the party offered possibilities of political cohesion which were not present elsewhere in North Africa.

The party benefited, of course, from Tunisia's "natural" linguistic homogeneity and compactness. Even more important was the cohesion of the elite that founded the party; it was based upon common ideals acquired at Sadiki and French universities but also upon a sense of opposition to the traditional *baldi* as well as to French rule. During the first two decades of the party's life its French-educated elite would expand considerably and include and include sons of the *baldi*; but common experiences within the party helped to maintain elite cohesion. In the last analysis the increment of cohesion that the party contributed to the elite was probable more important for Tunisia's future than the "mass mobilization" it sometimes engineered. Elite cohesion would ensure coherent government.

Moroccan Nationalism: Traditionalistic Anti-colonialism. From its inception in the mid-twenties until victory three decades later, Moroccan nationalism remained a diffuse coalition held together by common opposition to French rule. The distinct phases of Tunisian nationalism coexisted in the Moroccan movement, but the predominant Moroccan strain was traditionalistic anti-colonialism. And the symbol of national unity was not a party politician but rather the Sultan, a youth elected by the French in 1927 for his apparent docility. Mohammed V became a consummate diplomat and arbiter, but he was never an active political leader, much less innovator, dramatist and pedagogue like Bourguiba.

Some of the young Moroccans who had acquired a French university education after the First World War joined small discussion groups and associations of graduates, but they never constituted a movement comparable either in size or influence to the Young Tunisians. For in the late twenties other nationalists educated at Qarawiyin developed similar groups. In 1927 Ahmed Balafrej, representing the French-educated elite, joined forces with Allal al-Fassi, the leading firebrand among the Qarawiyin students. In 1930 they already began to agitate against French Berber policy; there was no time, as in Tunisia before World War I, for first-moment reactions to the French to be thought-fully articulated. Al-Fassi, rather than the French-trained intellectuals, provided most of the intellectual stimulus to the new movement.

Like Taalbi, Allal al-Fassi was strongly influenced by the Salafiyya movement of Islamic reform, which had roots in Morocco predating the Protectorate. Like Taalbi, too, his political thought combined rather than synthesized liberal constitutionalism and Islamic reformism; the former, he claimed, could be derived from a proper interpretation of Islamic texts. Indeed all modern innovations had to be judged by Islamic criteria, and political activity was subordinate to, and dependent upon, religious values. Unlike Taalbi, Al-Fassi never became a rigid traditionalist, but this was a reflection less of differences in their philosophies than of the evolution of their respective cultures. Al-Fassi remained in the vanguard of Moroccan Nationalism even after independence because politics and religion were never clearly distinguished as they come to be in Tunisia under the influence of the Neo-Destour's French educated elite. In the context of traditional urban Morocco, Al-Fassi remained an innovator. But his goal was a spiritual renaissance based upon a reassertion of early Islamic values, from which proper political order would follow, not a political reordering of society along Western lines. The dialectical antipodes were Islam and

Christianity, not Morocco and France.³⁸ In his *Autocritique*, published in 1952, he rejected dichotomies between the "modern" and the "traditional" by claiming, like many earlier Islamic reformers and apologists in the Near East, that early Islamic institutions were better and more advanced than contemporary "capitalist" ones and that Islam was essentially constitutional and democratic, however, "decadent" Moroccan institutions had become. While sometimes arguing that public opinion had to be guided by "a well-thinking elite," he advocated "popular supervision of the leaders" for Morocco. "All the disorders which Morocco experienced were due to the fact that the King was directly responsible to the people."³⁹ What was now needed was responsible cabinet government and constitutional monarchy along British lines. He wrote of the need, referring to Maurice Duverger as well as Ibn Khaldun, for a popularly elected constituent assembly after independence and of the desirability of a multi-party system. Al-Fassi was an open, extremely eclectic thinker with great magnetism. He appealed primarily to the youth of Morocco's traditional cities, especially his own city of Fez. His cautious acceptance of Western innovations was also compatible with the reformism of the French-trained sons of traditional upper strata.

But nationalism in Morocco never had a chance to enter the Tunisian third phase combining anti-colonialism with a wholehearted assimilation of metropolitan political styles and organization. The young leaders who sparked hostile reactions in the cities in 1930 against French Berber policy, and then founded the Committee of Moroccan Action and Subsequently, in 1937, the National Party, were the same men who in 1943 created the Istiqlal Party and retained control of it after independence. Though they incorporated younger graduates of French universities, like Abderrahim Bouabid and Mehdi Ben Barka, who were wholehearted modernizers, the younger elements did not have time before independence to articulate their divergencies or transform the movement. By the time they entered politics, after the Second World War, political events in Morocco were moving too rapidly for dissent within the Istiqlal to develop. Moreover, these potential Bourguibas who were of equally marginal status within the traditional social order lacked an autonomous political base such as the Tunisian Sahil. Fez remained traditionalist in outlook.

The newcomers, especially Ben Barka, invigorated the Istiqlal's organization and probably, like Bourguiba in Tunisia, considered it to be a weapon for refashioning society as well as for obtaining independence. but party organization never achieved either the discipline, continuity, or numerical strength (proportionate to population) of the Neo-Destour. At its peak in 1937 the Committee of Moroccan Action is estimated to have had 3,000 members in Fez, 1,500 in Rabat and Salé, 800 in Meknès, 700 in Casablanca, and 500 in Eastern Morocco.⁴⁰ At this time there was little rural mobilization, though in some areas the party was perceived a religious brotherhood of Allaliyines (followers of Allal al-Fassi) despite the fact that he combatted religious orders as Islamic heresies. When Al-Fassi and several other nationalist leaders were arrested --- for they were successful in electrifying crowds --- the embryonic party apparatus disappeared. It was only in late 1943, when Al-Fassi was still exiled in Gabon, that the party was resuscitated and rebaptized the Istiqlal (Independence) Party to include members of a splinter group which Hassan al-Wazzani had founded in 1937. The new party's Declaration of Independence on January 11, 1944, led to the arrest of four nationalist leaders, which provoked bloody incidents at Rabat, Salé, and Fez. This

³⁸ For a parallel interpretation, see Abdallah Laroui, *L'Idéologie arabe contemporaine* (Paris: Editions Maspéro, 1967).

³⁹ *Al-Istiqlal*, March 16, 1957.

⁴⁰ Robert Rézette, *Les Partis politiques marocains* (Paris: A. Colin, 1955) p. 279.

time, however, the party survived. After cautious beginnings, it increased its membership during the period 1947-1952 from an estimated 10,000-15,000 to 80,000. But intensive recruitment created problems of party discipline, and, from 1953 to 1955, when most leaders were again in jail or exile, the party lost control of the rank and file. Activists took the initiative of organizing terrorist bands in the cities and subsequently guerrilla warfare in the old *blad as-siba*.

Consequently the *Istiqlal* by independence had the prestige of its name but none of the institutional qualities of the *Neo-Destour*. Even more significant for Morocco's political development or lack of it, however, was the fact that the nationalist struggle had engendered new support for and altogether different institution, the Moroccan monarchy. As we have already seen, the traditional Moroccan sultans enjoyed greater legitimacy if less effectiveness than the Tunisian beys, since the former, descendants of the Prophet, were religious as well as political leaders. It was therefore logical for traditionalist nationalists to appeal to the Sultan for what Al-Fassi called the "mystique of governmental stability, of national consciousness, and of the State's existential continuity."⁴¹ On November 18, 1933, they created a special anniversary celebrating Mohammed V's accession to the throne. When the Sultan visited Fez the following year, nationalists organized a popular demonstration on his behalf and acclaimed him their "king," a Western and hence modern term, rather than "sultan." Mohammed V was visibly satisfied. He was too cautious by nature and too dependent upon the French for his throne to support the nationalists publicly, but he seems from this period to have kept discreetly in touch with them. After his famous meeting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1943, he actively encouraged the creation of the *Istiqlal*. In 1947 he openly took the offensive for the first time since his accession twenty years earlier. At Tangier he gave a speech which omitted a concluding homage to France. In a special press communiqué he insisted upon Morocco's Arab character and praised the Arab League. His eldest son and daughter, Moulay Hassan and Lalla Aicha, also took the public stage --- the latter appearing unveiled in modern dress. Tangier, as one French observer put it, was "a sort of festival of the imperial family."⁴²

When in 1952 Mohammed V refused to sign *dahirs* consecrating Franco-Moroccan "co-sovereignty," General Juin, the tough-minded French Resident who had been raised in Algeria, took threatening steps against his throne. The Pasha of Marrakech, Thami al-Glawi, was encouraged to break with Mohammed V, whom he declared to be the sultan of the *Istiqlal*, not of Morocco. The Glawi family, which had helped Lyautey and his successors to pacify the south, controlled most of the Berber tribes of the High Atlas and Anti-Atlas and of course owed most of its wealth and prestige to the Protectorate. Urban nationalists accused them of being "feudal" traitors, and in fact Thami al-Glawi did rule his populations in the medieval style of an exploiting caid, while French military protection secured his hold over a larger area than successful caids could have exploited before the Protectorate. In 1951 the Pasha mobilized some of his tribes and marched them to the city walls of Rabat and Fez. This was hardly a traditional *siba* --- but the threat of bloody incidents constrained the Sultan to sign the *dahirs* and to authorize his Grand Vizier to condemn the methods "of a certain party," meaning, of course, the *Istiqlal*. By threatening the Sultan, however, the French had made a mockery of the Treaty of 1912 and enhanced Mohammed V's prestige as nationalist leader.

⁴¹ *Al-Istiqlal*, March 16, 1957.

⁴² Roger Le Tourneau, *Evolution politique de l'Afrique du Nord musulmane 1920-1961* (Paris: A. Colin, 1962) p. 220.

Intransigent Protectorate officials were not content, even after arresting virtually all Istiqlal leaders in December, 1952, to leave a pro-nationalist sultan on the throne. Some theorized about the possibilities of a dynastic change to another family of descendants of the Prophets, the Idrisids. One member of this family assembled a congress of religious brotherhoods to attack the Sultan's religious policies. Meanwhile Thami al-Glawi marshaled support among minor local officials for replacing the Sultan. Again the tribes were made to march on Fez and Rabat. While the Laniel government was protracted strikes in France during the summer of 1953, Al-Glawi and French Protectorate officials forced its hand. Since he would not abdicate, Mohammed V was deposed on August 20 and exiled, together with his family, to Madagascar.

Popular reactions were utterly unanticipated. Shortly after the deposition, rumors circulated that "Mohammed Ben Youssef had become a martyr and a saint; God has now placed him in the moon to watch over us." Growing numbers of people awaited the moon to behold the figure of "Sidna" (our Lord) within it. As an English observer explained,

In its right hand half the lunar landscape showed a formation that suggested Sidi Mohammed's figure as known to every Moroccan from innumerable portraits. While that formation had always been there, it needed the jolt of the events of August to make people discover it. And the discovery was followed instantly by attribution to the image of a supernatural significance. Though the Sultan could no longer be seen in the flesh, "God ordained" that the people should behold him in a form even the Resident General could not obliterate. Allahu Akbar! --- God is Great! Having become thus inviolable, a focus for national sentiments, Sidi Mohammed had assumed an entirely novel stature and power.⁴³

Whatever its plausibility, the myth was believed by large numbers of superstitious women and rural Moroccan --- Berbers as well as Arabs --- whom the Istiqlal had not penetrated. For the latter's urban constituency, of course, the King had always been the prime symbol of the Moroccan nation.

Parallels have been suggested with "Moncefism," a reaction of Tunisians to a pro-nationalist bey who reigned for a year before being ousted by the French in 1943. Like Mohammed V, Moncef bey attempted to recover the substance as well as the form of his sovereignty recognized by treaty. Without the Resident's permission during the confused Vichy period, he appointed a government including leaders of both Destours. He enjoyed immense prestige among all nationalist circles at a time when Bourguiba was still in prison. Until he died in exile in 1948, he was a moral leader whom the Neo-Destour carefully cultivated. But there the parallel ends. While recognized as a devout Muslim sovereign by urban strata, Moncef bey had no special religious appeal. Moreover, the Neo-Destour did not need the prestige of a traditional sovereign to extend its influence in the countryside. And in the cities it was sufficiently strong before independence to dispense with an arbiter or a traditional intermediary. The Neo-Destour used the bey in its dealings with France but did not need Moncef's successor to enhance its own legitimacy.

⁴³ Rom Landau, *Moroccan Drama 1900-1955* (San Francisco: The American Academy of Asian Studies, 1956) pp. 323-24.

In Morocco, by contrast, an arbiter was essential after the Protectorate crumbled in late 1955. Outside traditional urban strongholds the Istiqlal had never acquired organizational roots, and even these were difficult to reestablish after the Istiqlal leaders were freed. During the Sultan's two years of exile new strata entered the political arena through participation in urban terrorism and in the Army of National Liberation. Politically most of them identified not so much with the Istiqlal as with Mohammed V. And even within the leadership of the Istiqlal, cohesion depended not so much on diffuse ideology or party loyalty as on allegiance to the King.

Thus colonial conflict enhanced the legitimacy of a traditional institution rather than displacing it, as in Tunisia, by a new institution. When Mohammed V returned from exile in 1955, on the twenty-eighth anniversary of his accession to the throne, he was welcomed as a nationalist hero, just as Bourguiba, the "supreme holy warrior," had been greeted in Tunis. The Moroccan masses whom the Istiqlal had not politically educated believed in his traditional baraka, while the disparate forces of modern nationalism looked to him to satisfy their demands for a national government. He was the one leader whose title to rule rested on sufficiently diverse modern and traditional grounds to satisfy virtually all sectors of the heterogeneous elite. By then even Al-Glawi had made his formal submission, for a rapid shift in tribal allegiances made him utterly dependent upon the Sovereign's forgiveness.

The Algerian Revolution: Aborted Dialectic. The French presence in Algeria was sufficiently intensive not only to eradicate all traditional institutions but also to prevent intellectual strata from creating new national institutions as in Tunisia. Furthermore, indigenous responses were not synchronized in such a way as to permit the actors to unite against colonial domination while wholeheartedly assimilating modern innovations. Rather the three responses --- liberal assimilation, traditionalistic anti-colonialism, and radical anti-colonialism --- were each articulated simultaneously in the thirties by distinctive strata. Political competition among these movements served further to divide rather than unite their constituents. Thus the assimilationist intellectuals, for instance --- and indeed intellectuals generally --- were distrusted by the petit bourgeois and proletarian revolutionaries, and vice versa. The timing of the respective responses, as well as the environment in which they operated, militated against a viable synthesis.

There were no old ruling and commercial strata, as in Morocco or Tunisia, within which nationalism would emerge and branch outward into the society, with the possible exception of the Constantine bourgeoisie, in part reconstituted in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Its petition to the French in 1887 perhaps anticipated the demands of reformist ulama of the thirties, but the grievances seem not to have had any immediate echo outside Constantine. Unlike its Tunisian counterpart, the small stratum of évolués (French-educated natives) who called themselves Young Algerians lacked clear connections with Algeria's precolonial elites. Identifying with liberal metropolitan opinion and cut off from their own society, they supported drafting Muslims before the First World War, in return for fiscal reform, more primary schools, more extended Muslim political representation, and an end to the oppressive indigénat (set of laws regulating the natives). Though accused by colonial administrators of being a "national movement against the French occupation," they were in fact Algeria's first generation of liberal assimilationists. While the Young Tunisians could take their social identity for granted, the Young Algerians sought only equality with other Frenchmen; some went so far as to advocate naturalization --- which was legally possible but not encouraged by the administration. The reforms of 1919 did not meet their expectations, and their one political victory, that of Emir Khaled, Abdelkader's grandson, being in the Algiers municipal elections of 1919, was quickly

annulled by the authorities. Nevertheless, assimilation continued to be the objective of the évolués when their representatives in elected Algerian bodies, including Ferhat Abbas, constituted the Fédération des Elus in 1934. Abbas's political testament recently summed the tragedy of his career and those of similar French-educated intellectuals:

One will well understand why my generation and those that preceded it obstinately looked to the republican and liberal France against the tyrannical and colonialist France. They thought that it was sufficient to enlighten the former of the contradictions which gave birth to our misfortunes so as to end them.⁴⁴

Actually Abbas' own political position changed radically from 1931, when he published a book subtitled "From Colony to Province" advocating assimilation, to the late fifties, when he headed the FLN's Algerian Provisional Government. After rejecting, in an often quoted statement in 1936, the existence of an Algerian nation, he concluded in his Manifesto of Algerian People (1943) that "the hour has passed when an Algerian Muslim asks other than to be a Muslim Algerian" and called for an Algerian constitution guaranteeing equal political rights to all its inhabitants. But he failed in the Second French Constituent Assembly and in the Council of the Republic to win a federal solution to Algeria's political problem. After 1951 his party, the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA), retained barely three thousand members. What had once, in 1946, been perhaps the strongest Algerian Muslim party had lost most of its audience because assimilationist nationalism was clearly inadequate: all attempts at reform within the legal French framework failed. No longer an independent political force, Abbas rallied to the FLN more than a year after the outbreak of the Revolution and became its political prisoner.

During his long political career Abbas reached a political position close to but never as revolutionary as Bourguiba's; indeed, the latter notes their political kinship but criticizes his lack of determination in a letter he addressed to Abbas in 1946. Their closest supporters were the same French-educated professional middle classes and students. But other Algerian parties and perhaps his personality blocked Abbas's efforts to reach down into the lower strata which Bourguiba was able to mobilize. His one big effort to develop a mass organization, the Amis du Manifeste during the Second World War, boomeranged when its congress rejected his resolution for an "autonomous Republic federated with the French Republic" and declared his rival Messali Hadj "the indisputable leader of the Algerian people." Even adopting Marxist vocabulary did not help Abbas to erase his "bourgeois" image among supporters of Messali's more revolutionary party. In his political testament Abbas quotes Camus: "L'histoire court pendant que l'esprit médite."⁴⁵

The Association of Ulama which Sheikh Abdelhamid Ben Badis founded in 1931 marked the entry into the Algerian political arena of an utterly different bourgeoisie, one of urban Islamic culture which also constituted the core of the Tunisian Destour and the Moroccan Istiqlal. Like Taalbi and Al-Fassi, Ben Badis fulminated against the religious brotherhoods, "the domestic animals of colonialism." He, too was inspired by the Salafiyya movement to reform Islam and was anti-colonialist in that he wished to defend Islam from Christianity. And like his counterparts, he countered French assimilation and Muslim Cultural decay by organizing modern Quranic schools. But in the Algerian context the significance of the movement was not the same. The Association

⁴⁴ Ferhat Abbas, *La Nuit coloniale* (Paris: Julliard, 1962) p. 110.

⁴⁵ "History runs while the spirit reflects." *Ibid.*, p. 106.

was never a political party. Its schools, partially suppressed, educated fewer children than either the Tunisian or Moroccan ones and half were concentrated in the province of Constantine. The cultural heritage it drew upon --- even that of the Constantine grandes familles from which Ben Badis came --- was in a much more advanced state of decomposition. But in the absence of any other distinctively Algerian bases of identity, the ulama's affirmation of Islamic religion and Arabic language had greater impact upon other Algerian nationalists than similar assertions in the less threatened Protectorates. Possibly, too, a contemporary Algerian historian is correct in judging Ben Badis, who seems to have been more open to modern currents than either Taalbi or Al-Fassi, to be Algeria's "only enlightened thinker of historic nationalism and modern culture."⁴⁶

Paradoxically the Association aligned itself in the thirties with Abbas's assimilationist group, even while Ben Badis was declaring that "this Muslim population is not France, cannot be France, and does not want to be France" and that "independence is a natural right for every people of the earth." For the ulama (like the leaders of the Old Destour) were political moderates, more concerned with education and culture than with immediate political change. But tactical alliances with Ferhat Abbas during the Popular Front period of anticipated reforms helped to increase the political distance between Ben Badis and Messali Hadj, who also wanted independence, but right away. It was perhaps unfortunate that the ulama participated with the assimilationists in the Muslim congresses of 1936, for radical Algerians were in greater need of the ulama's teachings than Abbas.

The radical anti-colonialists originated in Paris, not in Algeria, as an improbable group of North African (mostly Kabyle) workers who were organized by the French Communist Party in 1926 as the North African Star. Dissolved by the French government in 1929, the Star reappeared as the Glorious North African Star in 1932 and continued to confine its activities to France until the advent of the Popular Front. In 1927, when he was twenty-nine years old, Messali Hadj became the leader. He came from a Tlemcen family of "obscure religious personages" and had been one of the 173,000 Algerian Muslims to fight in the First World War.⁴⁷ He seems afterward to have drifted to Algeria and back to France to find a job. His education was rudimentary though his oratorical talents and organizational energies were tremendous among Algerian workers inclined to direct action. Once he had sympathized with a religious brotherhood; after the war he assimilated Communist organizational techniques though it is not clear whether he actually joined the party; shortly after returning to Algiers in 1936 he broke with the Communists; an extreme rightwing group, the Croix de Feu, helped him to found a new party, the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) after the Popular Front dissolved the refurbished Star. Julien remarks that some European settlers could not help feeling indulgent toward a native party whose members were always ready to say, "Down with the Jews."⁴⁸ Clearly, whichever the extremist European group attracting Messali's sympathies, he could not have been ideologically further apart from Abbas and his fellow moderates. Each had assimilated different slices of the French political spectrum. What they shared was the same marginality with respect to Algerian culture.

Though severely repressed like its predecessor, the PPA managed on the eve of the Second World War to have three thousand members --- as many as the Neo-Destour under similar

⁴⁶ Mostefa Lacheraf, *L'Algérie: nation et société* (Paris: Maspéro, 1965) p. 322.

⁴⁷ Le Tourneau, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

⁴⁸ Charles-André Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord en marche, nationalismes musulmans et souveraineté française* (Paris: Julliard, 1952) p. 120.

circumstances maintained. Its intransigent nationalism and social policies (de-emphasized in the move from Paris to Algiers) appealed primarily to urban workers. The fact that an obscure tramway employee campaigning for the party could win a Muslim seat on the Algiers municipal council was a measure of the PPA's popularity in 1938 in the city's proletarian districts. Unlike the predominantly European Algerian Communist Party, it stressed Algeria's Islamic and Arabic identity without, however, making common cause with the ulama.

Much like the Neo-Destour, the PPA and, after 1946, its overt political wing, the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), used religion tactically to mobilize a first-generation proletariat and other traditionalist strata. Religion was also a protection against assimilation by the Communists. Messali and his followers were neither concerned with Islam as an end in itself nor with the complexities of Salafiyya reform, and they had no respect for the timid tactics of the Association of Ulama --- an organization which lost much of its luster after Ben Badis died in 1940. Like the Neo-Destour, the PPA had strictly temporal objectives. But unlike the older party, it lacked experienced political revolutionaries who could unite theory and practice and tailor its tactics to a long-term strategy of political emancipation and nation-building. In Algeria the capable intellectuals were always political latecomers. In Tunisia, by contrast, the revolutionary theorists, like Bourguiba, trained and kept control over professional agitators like Messali who made excellent middle-level cadres.

The PPA-MTLD never seems to have had more than 15,000 members, but it had clearly outdistanced Abbas's rival party by the late forties. Like his early Communist mentors, Messali made a cult of organization: "If I were a teacher," he once said, "and the Algerian people my pupil, I would have to conjugate the verb 'to organize' every day."⁴⁹ His overt structure, the MTLD, operated within the legal order, contesting elections, participating in the various deliberative assemblies to which Muslims had limited access. The legally banned PPA remained the clandestine core of the movement. Under the orders of a member of its Central Committee, the paramilitary Organisation Spéciale (O.S.) developed a clandestine structure of its own, directed first by Hocine Ait Ahmed, then after 1949 by Ahmed Ben Bella. The PPA of course also created or infiltrated various parallel organizations for workers, youth, women, and students --- often in competition with the Communists --- as did the Neo-Destour in Tunisia for the same reason.

But in a sense Messali committed the error of traditional Muslim rulers who had thought they could acquire Western military techniques without transforming their societies, or of liberals who thought it possible to transplant Western constitutional forms. Communist organizational models could not be successfully imposed upon politically inexperienced "militants." Unlike the Communists, Messali did not articulate a doctrine. He could not explain to militants anxious for direct action why it might be useful simultaneously to win political points. Without an ideology, the party lacked an internal communications system of implicitly or explicitly shared symbols and values. Other than to risk prison and possibly torture, to agitate and obey orders, it was not clear what a "militant" really was or what he believed. Parallel overt and clandestine structures moreover blurred the lines of party hierarchy. As the FLN subsequently directed, "Leaders at all levels will watch that militants break with certain habits inherited from the MTLD: lateness at meetings, negligence in executing directives, idle chatter. . . ."⁵⁰ Without either a sociological or ideological basis of cohesion, splits rapidly appeared in the organizational weapon. The fact that

⁴⁹ Michael Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1960) p. 77.

⁵⁰ Colette and Francis Jeanson, *L'Algérie hors la loi* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1955) p. 309.

the PPA was clandestine made it difficult to develop internal institutions for resolving conflicts. Moreover, the French authorities consistently repressed overt local organization while sparing its national leaders, thus driving a further wedge between proponents of direct action and "reformist" leaders.

A young generation of intellectuals joined the party after the war and led a majority of the MTLD's Central Committee in 1953. But the party was already losing many of its less educated youthful activists, disenchanted with the tactical compromises of the legal party. The split between the "Centralists" and Messali became public the following year, the former accusing the latter of "verbal violence, agitation for agitation's sake, sectarianism and adventure" and the latter attacking the Centralists for "reformism" because they were cooperating with a liberal French mayor inside the Algiers municipal council. In fact many elements within the party, including the O.S. leaders, considered Messali outdated and rejected his "personality cult." But the clandestine activists equally distrusted the intellectuals. Compromise within the party was impossible as external alliances with either the ulama or Ferhat Abbas. Like the leader of UDMA, the Centralists were caught in the classic squeeze between the need to cooperate with liberal Frenchmen, strengthening their hand for carrying out limited reforms, and the danger of being outflanked by more intransigent elements. the Algerian Revolution, of course, erupted on November 1, 1954.

It came as a great surprise to most observers in 1962 when, after almost eight years of guerrilla struggle against tremendous odds, the Front of National Liberation achieved its objective of independence but immediately disintegrated into factions which threatened civil war in Algeria. But the Front suffered from the same political weaknesses which had rent apart the PPA-MTLD. The nine "historics" who launched the Front were all veterans of the O.S. It had been more out of disgust with the divisions of the traditional parties, especially their own PPA, than with any carefully designed plan in mind that some of them, along with others, had founded a Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action in March, 1954, and sworn a "moral contract" renouncing past nationalist rivalries. None of the Nine were university graduates; in fact only Ait Ahmed and possibly Boudiaf had secondary school education. Only one, Mohammed Khider, had national political experience, for he had served in the French National Assembly (1946-1951) while working in fact for the O.S. Though some had acquired military experience, none had risen to be officers in the French army. Their one common link was clandestine experience and a revolutionary faith in direct and violent action. Once Khider explained what distinguished the MTLD from UDMA: recourse to violence. "What separated us yesterday and perhaps even today from Ferhat Abbas and his friends is the refusal to believe in persuasion. There is a logic in violence, and it is necessary to carry this logic to its conclusion." Whether or not such a belief was shared by all the "reformist" politicians of the MTLD, it was certainly the macabre cement binding the FLN leaders together in 1954. And by its nature violence shuts off possibilities of rational articulation.

The outbreak of the Revolution bears all the marks of hasty improvisation. The FLN ignored the elementary Maoist lesson that it was necessary to prepare the political terrain before launching guerrilla attacks. The Nine seemed eager just to "do something." Most of the seventy-odd attacks coordinated for November 1 did little damage and immediately fizzled; only in the remote and under-administered Aurès Mountains was the rebellion able to survive, playing on the tribal sympathies and economic grievances of the Chawia Berbers. The program published the same day introducing the Front seemed equally rash and hasty, calling for the liquidation of "all vestiges of corruption and reformism," declaring a struggle "by all means" for the "restoration of the sovereign democratic and social Algerian State in the framework of Islamic principles," and

expressing willingness for the "authorized representatives of the Algerian people" to open negotiations only if France first recognized Algerian independence.

Miraculously the rebellion survived and developed considerable momentum a year later when Kabylia became organized. But the leadership did not remain united. Even before Ben Bella and three fellow "historics" were kidnapped by the French in mid-air between Morocco and Tunisia, their "external" leadership had been successfully contested by the "internal" maquisards (guerrillas) who on August 20, 1956, organized a rump "congress" of the FLN near the Valley of the Soummam in Lower Kabylia. There were also veiled rivalries between Kabyles and Arabs; the main organizers of the congress happened to be Kabyle, while the "externals," a majority of whom were Arab, happened not to have been informed in time to attend the congress. The new organization decided by the congress virtually eliminated the latter from effective command of the FLN, by requiring that the five-man executive be stationed on Algerian soil; the leaders elected by the congress included only two "historics." While Ben Bella insisted upon the sovereignty of the nine founders, the congress co-opted new leadership. Leaders of the prerevolutionary parties, like Ferhat Abbas, rallied as individuals in the Front, and the Revolution needed them to give it a respectable and representative facade. But they too threatened the legitimacy of the historics. By October 1956, when Ben Bella and his colleagues were captured, the "moral contract" of the Nine had evaporated; in any event within a year only Belkacem Krim remained alive and free. The principles and institutions established by the Soummam congress, however, became as contested as the original contract. And the leader who had masterminded the congress seems to have been assassinated by his colleagues shortly after the latter, on September 19, 1958, established a Provisional Algerian Government.⁵¹

The congress had decided the "priority of the political over the military organization" of the Revolution and the "priority of the internal over the external" forces, but within three years these priorities were reversed. The congress also appointed a National Council of the Algerian Revolution which was to be its sovereign "parliament" until peace allowed another congress to convene. The composition of the CNRA, however, was altered by a series of co-optations reflecting shifts in the strength of various military factions. Under wartime conditions it was not possible to devise functioning institutions and agreed-upon procedures for resolving the inevitable factional rivalries that plagued the Front. Guerrilla warfare entailed continuous fragmentation among and within Algeria's six wilayas and between these and the external centers of the Revolution. French experts in psychological warfare were able to play upon and intensify some of the internal divisions that resulted in Kabylia, for instance, in the liquidation of hundreds of "traitors" by the commander of the wilaya.

Divisions within the FLN during the war were due basically to the fact that there had been neither an incontestable leader, nor a political organization or an articulated ideology before the Revolution. Thus, unlike successful Communist guerrilla movements, it was unable to survive the fragmentation inherent in guerrilla warfare. In the heat of struggle, Algerians from all walks of life joined the Revolution, and those with the most initiative became local political-military leaders and sometimes worked their way into the national leadership. Few of the cadres had previous political experience, which in any event served to divide rather than unite them. The distances and clandestine conditions separating the wilayas from one another and from the Provisional Government made it impossible to establish a centralized political structure having nationwide local roots. The Revolution failed to develop ideology into an effective system of political

⁵¹ Claude Paillat, *Dossier secret de l'Algérie* (Paris: Presses de la cité, 1962) I, 155.

communication to enhance the cohesion of the cadres. These had a rapid turnover under the pressures of French military action (which was more successful in Algeria than in Vietnam). Even within the relatively small group of Algerians associated with the Provisional Government, there was no agreement on any single national leader who might have united the cadres. The only popular figure, Ferhat Abbas, lacked a following in the FLN. His successor as President of the Provisional Government, Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, was a former Centralist who had never acquired a popular following. Without a strong political organization in Algeria, he was helpless when Houari Boumedienne's organized armed forces on the Tunisian and Moroccan frontiers broke with the Provisional Government in June, 1962.

POLITICAL SPACES AND VACUUMS

Frantz Fanon and Pierre Bourdieu have suggested that the Algerian Revolution fundamentally altered the society. Affecting virtually everyone, it engendered national solidarity; Algerians could therefore accept modern styles and values introduced by the colonizer. Bourdieu argues that before the war traditional symbols and habits, such as the woman's veil and paternal authority, had acquired new meaning at methods of withdrawal from and resistance against the colonial situation. Effective armed resistance banished the need for these devices.

Each Algerian may henceforth assume full responsibility for his own actions and for the widespread borrowings he had made from Western civilization; he can even deny a portion of his cultural heritage without denying himself in the process. Because the negation of the system remains, permanent and unchanged, a negation made up of the sum total of all the refusals on the part of individuals, any innovation introduced by the West can be adopted without its acceptance being considered an expression of allegiance.⁵²

One illustration was the secular tone of the Soummam Platform, in marked contrast to the original FLN Program. Through violent struggle the Algerians acquired a sense of confidence allowing them, like the Tunisians a generation earlier under Bourguiba, to assimilate modern values. But the colonial dialectic did not produce in Algeria either a coherent modernizing elite or the political organization needed to retain this confidence and give direction to the Revolution.

On balance, colonial conflict was obviously most constructive in Tunisia, where it engendered an elite that was capable of nationalizing, so to speak, both the modern colonial structures and the political culture that had produced them. The protracted conflict encouraged the development of a political organization that enhanced the cohesion of the elite and facilitated the implementation of its purposes. In Morocco the conflict was less constructive, in that the nationalist elite remained predominantly traditionalist in outlook, sharing a culture more congruent with past than with modern colonial structures. The elite remained less cohesive, moreover, than its Tunisian counterpart, and less experienced in sustaining a political organization that might increase its cohesion. In Algeria the conflict was least constructive, in that elites, though sharing radical attitudes in the abstract, remained both fragmented and disorganized. In all three settings the nationalists ultimately captured the alien instruments of rule --- bureaucracies guaranteeing a

⁵² Pierre Bourdieu, *The Algerians* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962) pp. 157-58.

fixed territory, law and order, and tax revenues. But these signs of political development, these aspects of political space, could not guarantee any of the capacity for self-sustained political development characteristic of modern political systems. In this respect the crucial colonial legacy, accounting for critical differences in political development between contemporary Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, was the nationalist elite and organization generated by the struggle.
